THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BATSON: MIXED
MOTIVES AND DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
Russell D. Covey
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on account of protected characteristics
such as race and sex. Mixed-motive problems arise where the
proponent of a strike confesses to have been motivated by a
combination of proper and improper purposes. In other contexts,
so-called “mixed-motive analysis,” which provides the challenged
party an opportunity to prove that the “same decision” would have
been made absent the improper motive, has been permitted. The
United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled, however, on whether
“mixed-motive” analysis is consistent with the governing framework
set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, and those state and federal courts
that have addressed the issue have reached different conclusions.
This Article argues that the mixed-motive defense should not be
permitted under Batson. That tool was developed in a very different
context, serves purposes not relevant to discrimination in jury
selection, and undermines Batson’s basic goals. The Article
proposes adoption instead of a “motivating” or “substantial” factor
test, as currently used in Title VII mixed-motive cases, to determine
when peremptory strikes based on mixed motives violate the
Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
The lawfulness of both state and private conduct frequently
depends on the purposes that motivated the conduct, and a wide
range of statutory and constitutional law renders otherwise lawful
actions unlawful if they are motivated by an illicit purpose. Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for instance, prohibits employers from
making employment decisions on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
nationality,1 and the First Amendment bars the government from
firing an employee because of her exercise of protected speech
1

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to
2000e-17 [hereinafter “Title VII”]).
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rights.2 Whenever such actions are the subject of legal challenge,
courts ultimately must determine what purpose or motive caused the
actor to pursue the challenged course of action. Motivations,
however, are complex; decisions are often made for multiple
purposes. Sometimes, the purposes motivating those actions reflect
a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate objectives, raising what has
frequently been referred to as the “mixed motive” problem.
The mixed-motive problem raises especially troubling
implications in the context of jury selection. The Supreme Court
long ago recognized that the exclusion of jurors from the venire
because of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 As with employment decisions under Title
VII, the lawfulness of a peremptory strike to exclude a juror from the
venire turns on the proponent’s purpose. Although peremptory
strikes traditionally have permitted the parties to exclude any juror
for any reason, or for no reason, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme
Court held that a peremptory strike is unconstitutional if it is used to
exclude a juror on account of race.4 Not surprisingly, courts
adjudicating Batson disputes have encountered the same mixedmotive problem that arises in other kinds of disputes the resolution
of which turns on the purposes of the actor.
In other areas of law, the Supreme Court has sanctioned what
is often referred to as “dual-motive” or, as here, “mixed-motive”
analysis.5 Mixed-motive analysis provides a party that has been
proven to have acted from an unlawful motive an affirmative
defense to demonstrate that it would have chosen the same course of
action, or made the “same decision,” entirely from other lawful
2

Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287 (1977).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). At least since 1954, the Court has
acknowledged that the “constitutional command” of the equal protection clause prevents
prosecutors from excluding not only blacks from jury service, but any “identifiable group
in the community which may be the subject of prejudice.” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 204 (1965) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1945)) (holding that equal
protection clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of ancestry and national origin as
well as race).
4
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5
See Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287 (1977)),
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also infra Parts I.A-B.
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motives.6 Depending on the specific area in which the samedecision defense is asserted, success in showing that the unlawful
motive was not the “but-for” cause of the challenged action can
result in anything from a mere limitation on damages to complete
vindication on the merits. Although the first state courts to
encounter the mixed-motive problem in Batson rejected the use of
mixed-motive analysis, and several state courts continue to bar its
use, a small but steadily growing number of courts, including all six
federal circuit courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue, have
permitted or affirmatively endorsed its use.7 The Supreme Court,
however, has not yet sanctioned the use of mixed-motive analysis in
the Batson context.
In this Article, I argue that the turn to mixed-motive analysis
in jury selection is a serious mistake, one that threatens to undermine
the fragile foundations upon which Batson stands. The argument
proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the origins of mixed-motive
analysis, showing how the Supreme Court crafted that analysis from
a variety of disparate sources as an analogue to two doctrines of
criminal procedure: the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, and the
doctrine of harmless error. The standard was chosen as an express
alternative to more traditional tort-law causation standards,
notwithstanding the Court’s frequent reliance on basic tort constructs
in its equal protection jurisprudence. After considering the general
origins and functions of mixed-motive analysis, the Article discusses
three ways state and federal courts have responded to the mixedmotive problem in the jury-selection context. First, some courts
have held that a prosecutor’s admission of any improper bias “taints”
a strike and requires invalidation under Batson.8 Second, other
courts have in effect disregarded the improper reason and utilized
the regular Batson framework in an attempt to determine whether the
permissible reasons were legitimate or “pretextual.”9 Third, a
growing number of courts have invoked mixed-motive analysis to
assess whether such mixed explanations are consistent with Batson.10
6

See infra Part I.A (discussing mixed-motive defense).
See infra nn. 111-116 (citing cases).
8
See infra notes 94-100.
9
See infra note 179.
10
See infra notes 105-116.
7
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Part II assesses the propriety of these various responses under the
formal Batson framework. It establishes that, given the governing
equal protection standards, a peremptory strike is facially invalid
where the strike’s proponent attempts to justify it with a mixedmotive explanation. Part II further demonstrates that once a finding
of mixed-motives has been made, it is erroneous to proceed any
further under the conventional Batson framework.
Some courts that have relied on mixed-motive analysis,
however, have treated the mixed-motive defense as a supplement to
the Batson framework. Part III shows how and why supplementing
Batson with mixed-motive analysis is inappropriate and destructive
of Batson’s purposes. Batson serves important symbolic, deterrent,
and diversity-enhancing functions. The use of mixed-motive
analysis undermines each of these functions. Mixed-motive analysis
also detracts from Batson’s important evidentiary function of easing
the crippling burden of proof that, prior to Batson, had prevented
practical enforcement of equal protection doctrine in jury selection.
Rather than make it easier to prove discrimination, mixed-motive
analysis encourages obfuscation, fails to recognize subconscious
bias, and substantially complicates an already highly speculative and
easily-evaded inquiry.
The better solution, Part IV argues, is stringent enforcement
of Batson’s narrow neutrality requirement through application of the
same causation test that Congress has relied upon to resolve the
mixed-motive problem in the Title VII context. As Congress
recognized, to determine whether an equal protection violation has
occurred in a mixed-motive case, the question to ask is whether an
improper criterion was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor for the
challenged strike. This standard has long been used in tort cases
involving multiple sufficient causes. As in those cases, the more
restrictive “same-decision” test’s insistence on “but-for” causation
leads to unjust results and permits wrongdoers to escape liability for
their concededly wrongful conduct. Because the primary concerns
that motivated the creation of the mixed-motive defense – windfall
protection and harmless error review – are not relevant in the unique
context of peremptory challenge regulation, the use of that defense
in Batson cases is not appropriate, and should not be permitted.

MIXED MOTIVES

6

Instead, Batson and its progeny are best read to bar any peremptory
strike in which race, ethnicity, or gender was a “substantial” or
“motivating” factor for its exercise; permitting such race-based
strikes under the guise of “mixed-motive” would render Batson’s
already meager protections “unbearably” light.
I. MIXED-MOTIVE ANALYSIS AND BATSON
With Batson, the Court attempted to impose meaningful
prohibitions on the use of race-based peremptory challenges for the
first time. Several subsequent cases, handed down in quick
succession, broadened and deepened the core principle of Batson
that peremptory strikes may not be used to mask or advance
invidious discriminatory purposes. The Batson rule now applies not
only to the exclusion of jurors on account of race, but also to
exclusions on account of gender and ethnicity; 11 it may be invoked
by the prosecutor as well as the defendant;12 it applies in civil actions
as well as criminal prosecutions;13 and it can be invoked regardless
of whether the excluded jurors are of the same race, ethnicity, or
gender as the objecting party.14
Although there is no shortage of critics to point out that
Batson has not eradicated discrimination in jury selection,15 it is
11

See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-366 (1991) (recognizing applicability
of Batson prohibition to ethnic minorities (hispanics); United States v. Martinez-Salazar,
528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (citing Hernandez as involving challenges based on “ethnic
origin”); J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying Batson to strikes
based on gender). At present, it is unclear whether Batson also prohibits the use of
peremptories based on religion. See John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors
Based Upon or Affecting Religion, 34 SETON HALL. L. REV. 435 (2004) (arguing that
Batson should be extended to bar religion-based challenges).
12
See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
13
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
14
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
15
See, e.g., Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation:
Are They Constitutional? 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 139, 199 (stating that “most commentators
and practicing lawyers feel that Batson and its progeny have not only stopped short of
destroying peremptory challenges but have been so ineffective that they have rarely
stopped peremptory challenges based only on unambiguously unconstitutional criteria
such as race or gender”); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
209-210 (1989); David Cole, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 120 (The New Press 1999) (arguing that
“Batson .. is generally ineffective at stopping even blatant racists"); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.,
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beyond dispute that it has had a major impact on criminal procedure.
Litigation under Batson has proliferated, and Batson objections are
now an important weapon in the defense lawyer’s arsenal, both at
trial and on appeal.16 Moreover, there is reason to believe that
Batson has succeeded, at least at the margins, in eliminating the most
overt forms of racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination from jury
selection.17
There is also reason to believe the Court will continue to
attempt to advance Batson’s basic goals. Its decision last term in
Miller-El v. Dretke,18 for instance, displayed a remarkable
impatience with the Fifth Circuit’s willingness to overlook quite
pronounced discriminatory practices. Capping a protracted struggle
with the Fifth Circuit that required not one but two decisions, the
Court invoked Batson to reverse Thomas Miller-El’s 20-year-old
murder conviction, overriding state and federal court findings that
the convictions were not tainted by racial discrimination.19 But if
Miller-El raises hope that courts at the highest levels will no longer
abide overt discrimination in jury selection, another development in
the lower federal courts’ Batson jurisprudence – the slow but steady
advance of “mixed-motive” analysis – threatens to undermine that
promise.

Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate
Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 213 (2003) (arguing that Batson “has, in practice, been
decidedly ineffective in achieving its original goals”).
16
A Lexis-Nexis search for the words “Batson” and “jury” limited to state and federal
cases cases reported during the calendar year of 2005 alone produced 556 hits.
17
See, e.g., David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner,
Barbara Broffitt, Symposium: The Use Of Peremptory Challenges In Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal And Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 123 (2001) (concluding
that empirical study of jury selection practices in Philadelphia shows that Supreme
Court’s “prohibitions against the use of race and gender as the basis for the use of
peremptories have had, at best, only a marginal impact on the peremptory strike strategies
of each side”).
18
125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
19
The Court found the state court’s conclusion to be an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence, indicating a rare willingness to overturn factual findings
on habeas review, and emphasizing that “[t]he standing is demanding but not insatiable;
as we said the last time this case was here, ‘[d]eference does not by definition preclude
relief’”) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2002)).
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A. Origins of Mixed-Motive Analysis
Mixed-motive analysis originated in two Supreme Court
cases: Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,20 and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.21
These cases suggest that the mixed-motive test was devised
primarily for two seemingly disparate purposes: to establish a
remedial limitation in tort-like actions against the government, and
to limit the ability of plaintiffs to challenge legislative and
administrative actions based on evidence that some members of the
governing body harbored some type of illicit bias. As will be
discussed below, there is a conceptual link between these functions.
In both instances, the problem motivating the use of mixed-motive
looks like a kind of “harmless error” review.
Mt. Healthy, which has been described as a “mixed-motives
constitutional tort case,”22 illustrates mixed-motive analysis’
remedial limitation focus. The case involved an untenured teacher
named Doyle, who during a period in which there were substantial
tensions between Doyle and the school board regarding, inter alia,
the teacher dress code, reported the contents of a school
memorandum on the teacher dress code to a radio disk jockey, who
in turn promptly reported it as news.23 One month later, the school
board decided not to renew Doyle’s contract. When Doyle requested
an explanation, the school superintendent gave several reasons,
including Doyle’s call to the radio station.24 Doyle challenged the
school board’s decision not to rehire him, arguing that the decision
to terminate his contract was an act of retaliation for his exercise of
his First Amendment rights. The District Court held that Doyle was
entitled to reinstatement, reasoning that “Doyle’s telephone call to
20

429 U.S. 274 (1977). See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1260 (1988) (identifying Mt. Healthy as “[t]he doctrinal
genesis of the ‘same decision’ test of causation).
21
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
22
Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court’s
Rhetoric and its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 65 (1998) (quoting Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.6
(3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995).
23
429 U.S. at 282.
24
Id. at 282-283 and n.1.
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the radio station was ‘clearly protected by the First Amendment,’
and … played a ‘substantial part’ in the decision of the Board not to
renew Doyle’s employment.”25 The Court of Appeals affirmed.26
The language used by the District Court suggests that it
analyzed the causation issue borrowing principles from tort law. In
tort, an act normally is considered a legal cause of a harm only if it is
the “but-for” cause, that is, an act may be a legal cause of the
“plaintiff’s damage if but for its commission the damage would not
have happened.”27 But the common law of torts recognizes an
exception to the strict requirement of but-for causation in cases of
multiple sufficient causes, where the wrongful conduct was
sufficient to bring about the harm but there was another separate and
independent force that would have brought about the same harm.28
In that instance, even though the harm would have occurred anyway
as a result of the other cause, as long as the actor’s wrongful conduct
was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm, the actor may
be held liable.29 Mixed-motive cases can be analogized to multiple
25

Id. at 283 (quoting unpublished opinion of district court).
See Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education, 529 F.2d 524 (6th
Cir. 1975) (table decision).
27
Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 946 (1935). Of
course, normally, but-for causation is not enough; there must also be proximate
causation. Traditional tort law principles thus further require that the wrongful conduct
not only was the but-for cause of the harm, but also was a “substantial factor” in causing
the harm to occur. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
28
The exception is longstanding. See, e.g., Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of
Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 109 n.20 (noting exception to proposition that liability
requires but-for causation “where two or more tortious causes are simultaneously
operating, each being independent of the other, and each being alone sufficient to
produce the damaging result”); Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902).
29
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §432 (2), at 430. The “substantial factor” test was
first developed by Judge and tort-scholar Jeremiah Smith. See Jeremiah Smith, Legal
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103 , 303, 309-314 (1912). Recognition of
the exception has been noted in numerous cases. See, e.g., McElwee v. Wharton 7
Fed.Appx. 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “Michigan law is clear that when multiple
factors contribute to a plaintiff's injury, liability may be imposed when a defendant's
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury.”); Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp.,
155 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he substantial factor standard … has
been embraced as a clearer rule of causation [than the 'but for' test]-one which subsumes
the 'but for' test while reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, such as
those involving independent or concurrent causes in fact”). See infra, Part IV.B
(discussing the substantial factor test in tort law).
26
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sufficient causation cases, in that two concurrent “forces” – a legal
motive and an illegal one – both “cause” an actor to follow a
particular course of action. The district court apparently applied this
tort-law causation principle, and upon finding that the Board’s
consideration of protected conduct played a “substantial part” in its
decision not to renew the contract, concluded that Doyle had carried
his burden of proof on the causation issue.
In an opinion authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the tort-based approach used
by the District Court in which proof that the exercise of first
amendment rights played a “substantial part” in the board’s decision
mandated judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. Such a standard, the
Court indicated, could bestow an undeserved windfall on Doyle.
The Court reasoned that “[t]he constitutional principle at stake is
sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a
position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.”30 Although it
recognized that the board had acted unlawfully in considering
Doyle’s protected conduct, it apparently believed that Doyle was not
entitled to reinstatement if the Board would have terminated his
contract regardless of the scuffle over his exercise of First
Amendment rights.31
Instead of relying on tort causation standards to determine
whether the constitutionally-protected conduct was a “cause” of the
decision to terminate Doyle’s contract, as the district court did,
Justice Rehnquist looked for guidance to analyze the problem of
mixed motives in an unlikely source: constitutional criminal
procedure. Reviewing a variety of confession and exclusionary rule
cases in which the admissibility of evidence turned on whether the
evidence was obtained “because of” unlawful police conduct,32
30

Id. at 285-286.
Id. at 286 (reasoning that reinstatement would not be commensurate with the harm if
the Board were “precluded, because it considered constitutionally protected conduct in
deciding not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a trier of fact that quite apart
from such conduct Doyle’s record was such that he would not have been rehired in any
event.”).
32
See id. at 286 (noting that “[I]n other areas of constitutional law, this Court has found it
necessary to formulate a test of causation which distinguishes between a result caused by
a constitutional violation and one not so caused,” and that “those are instructive in
formulating the test to be applied here,” and citing Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64
31
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Rehnquist cobbled together a causation standard that permits the
defendant to argue, as a functional affirmative defense, that there
was not a sufficient causal link between the constitutional violation
and the adverse action. Under this so-called “same decision”
defense,33 once the plaintiff establishes that his constitutionally
protected conduct “was a ‘substantial’ ... or ... ‘motivating factor’ in
the [alleged wrongdoer]’s decision not to rehire him,” the defendant
retains the opportunity to show, “by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have reached the same decision ... even in the absence
of the protected conduct.”34 In invoking these criminal procedure
precedents in Mt. Healthy, the Court established a causation defense,
the breadth of which was not then made clear, but which operated in
Mt. Healthy to award the benefit of a causally overdetermined result
to the governmental entity. This narrow causation doctrine provides
that if the permissible motivations for the government’s action
constituted an “independent source” of the adverse result, then that
result cannot be fairly blamed on the impermissible motive, and no
remedy is warranted.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation, which utilized the same burden-shifting framework
and which was decided the same day, illustrates a second and
seemingly quite different function of the mixed-motive test: the
development of a methodology to review claims of unconstitutional
motivation in legislative or administrative decisionmaking. In
Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs sought a zoning variance from the
Village to permit construction of a low-income housing project that
was expected to benefit minorities. After the application was denied,
the plaintiffs brought an equal protection challenge against the
Village, and presented proof that some zoning board members were
in fact motivated by racially-discriminatory purposes. That proof
alone, however, was insufficient to overturn the zoning board’s
decision. As the Court explained:
S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481 (1944); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963);
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 34 (1939); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790, 796 (1970)).
33
See Belton, supra note 20, at 1369-1370 (describing Mt. Healthy framework as creating
the “‘same decision’ defense”).
34
429 U.S. at 287.
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Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in
part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not
necessarily have required invalidation of the
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that
the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered.35
The framework adopted in Arlington Heights, in which the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant upon proof that an illicit
criteria was a motivating factor in the decision, was lifted directly
from Mt. Healthy. Its application in this very different context,
however, reflects a rejection of the approach to the review of
legislative motive embodied in the Court’s controversial decision in
Palmer v. Thompson.36 In Palmer, the Court refused to overturn the
city of Jackson, Mississippi’s decision to shut down its public
swimming pools rather than operate them on an integrated basis,37
reasoning that motive was irrelevant to the question of whether state
action violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Arlington Heights,
the Supreme Court reconceptualized the role that motive should play
in the constitutional inquiry along the lines sketched out by
Professor Paul Brest in his influential article on the problem.38
There are three types of responses to a scenario in which
evidence shows that a decisionmaker harbored an illicit motive.
First, one could ignore the evidence, as the Court did in Palmer.
Second, one could find a per se equal protection violation. Third,
one might require one of the parties to prove that the illicit motive
“mattered.” Decrying any “blanket refusal to inquire into legislative
and administrative motivation,” but acknowledging the difficulties
of judicial review of motivation that arise regarding “proof,
appropriate relief, and respect for political processes,” Brest urged

35

429 U.S. at 271 n.21.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
37
Id. at 218-19.
38
See Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. 266 n.11 (citing Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95,
116-118).
36
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the third course.39 Although equal protection doctrine accords
decisions based on race the strictest level of scrutiny, courts are
nonetheless expected to exercise great restraint in reviewing
legislative enactments, and when they do, to grant such enactments
the presumption of regularity.40 But that deference must end where
the decisionmaker acts from a flatly unconstitutional motive. As
Professor Brest had argued, “[I]f the decisionmaker gave weight to
an illicit objective, the court should presume that his consideration of
the objective determined the outcome of the decision and should
invalidate the decision in the absence of clear proof to the
contrary.”41 Because it is reasonable to presume that an illicit motive
had a causal influence on the outcome, such proof “rebuts whatever
presumption of regularity otherwise attaches.”42 Furthermore, it is
fair to “place on the decisionmaker a heavy burden of proving that
his illicit objective was not determinative of the outcome.”43
Accordingly, legislative or administrative enactments can withstand
challenge where the state can demonstrate that even though the illicit
purpose infected the decisionmaking process, it was not the “butfor” cause of the decision.
The “same-decision” test functions much like a “harmless
error” doctrine for purposes of evaluating legislative motive.44
Under the harmless constitutional error doctrine, a trial marred by
constitutional error does not per se mandate reversal of a conviction.
As set forth in the leading constitutional harmless error case,
Chapman v. California, “there may be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
39

See id. at 134-135.
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (explaining that “[a]lthough
race-based decisionmaking is inherently suspect, until a claimant makes a showing
sufficient to support that allegation the good faith of a state legislature must be
presumed”) (internal quotations omitted).
41
See Brest, supra note 38, at 117-118.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 118.
44
See, e.g., Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir.1980) (characterizing samedecision test as “harmless error” test). Indeed, if the Court found support for the mixedmotive framework in the theoretical approach advocated by Professor Brest, he in turn
looked to harmless constitutional error doctrine as a model. See Brest, supra note 38, at
118 n.114 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
40
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insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution,
be deemed harmless.”45 However, because of the potential for
injustice, a more stringent standard of review is required where a
conviction is tainted by constitutional error. Whereas under the
conventional harmless error rules, a conviction may be affirmed
merely upon a showing that the error did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights,46 where a constitutional right has been breached,
an error can be found harmless only if the prosecutor carries the
higher burden of proving that the error “was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”47 As Professor Brest reasoned, proof that the
decisionmaker “is known to have taken account of constitutionally
illicit objectives, together with the probability that the objectives
were outcome-determinative,” justify shifting this “heavy burden” of
proof to the decisionmaker.48 In invoking the same-decision test, the
Court in Arlington Heights fairly faithfully followed Brest’s
approach.
In the equal protection context, the Mt. Healthy/Arlington
Heights “same decision” test has been used primarily as a tool to
evaluate legislative motive. In fact, the Supreme Court’s only two
equal protection cases in which it has invoked the Mt. Healthy samedecision test have arisen in this context.49 In those cases, the mixedmotive defense has functioned like a harmless error test for
collective decisionmaking, whereby the Court has declined to
invoked a per se rule of invalidation. Instead, it has indicated that
the normal deference owed the decisionmaker upon finding that the
decisionmaking process was marred by consideration of an
unconstitutional objective would be withdrawn. Evidence that a
decision was tainted by discriminatory motive creates a presumption
of error that can be overcome, however, if the government can
demonstrate that the discriminatory motive was causally “harmless.”
45

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
47
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
48
Brest, supra note 38, at 118 n.114.
49
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (considering challenge to denial of rezoning request alleged to have been motivated by race discrimination); Hunter v.
Underwood, 71 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that felon disenfranchisement law was the
product of discriminatory purpose, notwithstanding additional “neutral” purpose of
disenfranchising poor whites).
46
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Although the purposes of mixed-motive analysis in the two
cases appear distinct, there is a common thread that ties them
together. In both cases, the availability of the defense provides the
court with a tool to deny relief notwithstanding evidence that the
decisionmaker harbored an unlawful motive, where the effect of
judicial intervention would be costly to the government and largely
futile. In constitutional tort cases such as Mt. Healthy, a court order
requiring a government employer to reconsider its decision to
withhold tenure is likely to be ineffective if there are other,
reasonable grounds for the decision, and awarding him damages
would simply result in a windfall. In legislative motive cases,
invalidation of the legislative enactment would likely be futile if the
legislature can simply repass the same statute by rephrasing its
intended goals.
B. Mixed-Motive and Title VII
Although originally crafted in the constitutional context
described above, mixed-motive analysis quickly found a home in
employment discrimination law,50 and particularly in the
adjudication of claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.51 Mixed-motive analysis received its most extensive
treatment in the Title VII context in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 52
Prior to Price Waterhouse, there was widespread disagreement
among the lower courts regarding the proper causation standards to
apply in mixed-motive Title VII cases.53 Although some Circuits
had applied the Mt. Healthy causation rule, others held that a
50

See N.L.R.B. v. Trans. Management; East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that the company's
failure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was entitled to
prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not qualified
and would not have been hired in any event” (citing International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 369 n. 53 (1977), and Mt. Healthy City Board
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287 (1977)).
51
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to
2000e-17 [hereinafter “Title VII”]). See Sheila A. Skojec, Effect of Mixed or Dual
Motives in Actions Under Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunities Subchapter) of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.); 83 A.L.R. Fed. 268 (collecting
cases).
52
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
53
Id. at 238 n.2 (citing cases).
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violation of Title VII was complete for liability purposes upon proof
that it had been motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory
purpose.54
The Price Waterhouse case resolved that dispute. Ann
Hopkins, who had been nominated for partnership at the accounting
firm Price Waterhouse, was the only female candidate of the 88
persons proposed for partnership that year. Although Hopkins
performance at the firm compared favorably with the other
partnership candidates, there were some legitimate criticisms of her
performance and ability.55 At the same time, there was substantial
evidence that some Price Waterhouse partners held Hopkins to a
higher standard because she was a woman.56 In short, the evidentiary
record demonstrated that both legitimate and illegitimate factors
motivated the decision to reject her partnership bid.
The case squarely raised the issue of what “standard of
causation” under Title VII was sufficient to establish a statutory
violation in a mixed-motive case. The defendant advocated a
standard that would have required Hopkins, who had shown that her
gender played a part in an employment decision, to prove but-for
causation – that “the decision would have been different if the
employer had not discriminated.”57 Hopkins, on the other hand,
argued for a per se rule – that liability should be complete upon a
showing that an impermissible criterion played “any part in an
employment decision.”58

54
See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.
1984) (Kennedy, J.) (distinguishing between liability and remedial standards in Title VII
cases, and holding as to former that “where employment discrimination affects the
applicant's score or the evaluative process, it suffices to impose initial liability to find that
sex was a significant factor in the decision not to process an application further or in the
decision to terminate an employee,” but as to latter, “an award of back pay or an order of
reinstatement is appropriate only if the discrimination is a but for cause of the disputed
employment action, and it follows that a showing of nonqualification would bar such
relief”).
55
490 U.S. at 234.
56
Id. at 235-236.
57
Id. at 237-238.
58
Id. at 238. Hopkins further argued that the employer should, at most, be permitted to
prove that “it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination,”
which would merely limit equitable relief. Id.
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In a splintered opinion, the Court rejected both positions.
Writing for a plurality, Justice Brennan crafted a compromise
approach, which he attempted to defend using the language of tort
law.59 Invoking the multiple sufficient cause doctrine in tort,
Brennan argued that it makes no sense to say that a causally
overdetermined outcome, for instance, one in which two forces
operate on an object and both forces are sufficient to disturb the
object – has no cause. Instead, Brennan reasoned, it makes more
sense to say that both forces were “causes” of the outcome.60 As
noted above, in the case of multiple sufficient causation, tort law has
long held that proof that the defendant’s wrongful conduct was a
“substantial factor” in the outcome is sufficient to warrant holding
the defendant liable for the harm, even if his wrongful conduct was
not “strictly speaking” the but-for cause of the harm. Like the
district court in Mt. Healthy, the plurality indicated that the
substantial factor test was the proper standard, and that “[t]he
question is not whether the other causes would have been sufficient
without the defendant’s wrong, but whether the defendant’s wrong
was actually a material factor in producing the injury.”61 Applying
that logic, Brennan asserted that a Title VII plaintiff carries her
burden on the issue of causation if she establishes that a
discriminatory criterion was a substantial factor relied upon by the
employer in reaching its decision.62 That other motives also
influenced the employer’s decision does not negate the causal
significance of the illicit motive, since “Title VII meant to condemn
even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate considerations.”63 The plurality reasoned that the
plaintiff is not required to prove “but-for causation” because the
statute focuses on the actual conduct of employers. In a case where
an adverse employment decision was motivated in fact by an illicit
criterion – in other words, where the improper criterion was actually

59

See Maatman, supra note 22, at 18 (noting that plurality in Price Waterhouse case
employed legal language borrowed from tort law “to justify its causation standard”).
60
490 U.S. at 241.
61
Carpenter, supra note 27, at 952.
62
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241-242.
63
Id. at 241.
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in the heads of the decisionmaker – the purposes of the statute have
been contravened.
The plurality’s adherence to the tort multiple sufficient
causation model, however, ended there. In an analytical move
rightly criticized by the dissent as internally inconsistent, the
plurality, joined by Justices White and O’Connor, went on to hold
that although the plaintiff has carried her burden on the causation
issue by proving that an illicit criteria was a “substantial” or
“motivating factor” in the decision, the defendant could nonetheless
avert an ultimate determination of liability if it could establish, under
the “mixed-motive” standard set forth in Mt. Healthy and Arlington
Heights, that the illicit criteria was not the “but-for cause” of the
decision.64 But-for causation, the Price Waterhouse court indicated,
was a necessary ingredient in a Title VII liability determination, but
the Court agreed that the burden to prove lack of but-for causation
should shift to the defendant, a wrongdoer who “knowingly created
the risk” that but-for causation cannot be proven one way or the
other, “not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.”65 A
majority of justices agreed that “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case
shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by

64

Id. at 247 n.12 (noting dissent’s failure to explain why the evidentiary scheme endorsed
in Mt. Healthy was not workable in Title VII cases); id. at 258 (White, J., concurring)
(“to determine the proper approach to causation in this case, we need look only to the
Court’s opinion in Mt. Healthy”); id. at 268 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (relying on
Arlington Heights). The Court also relied heavily on a case arising under federal labor
law, NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), which also
utilized the same mixed-motive framework set forth in Mt. Healthy. See id. at 403.
According to the Court, once the factfinder establishes that the challenged action was
motivated in part by discriminatory animus, the burden shifts to the challenged party to
“carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision.” Id. at 248. The challenged party, “if
it wishes to prevail, must persuade” the factfinder “by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have reached the same decision” even absent the impermissible motive. Id.
at 249.
65
Id. at 250 (plurality opinion) (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt., 462 U.S. at
403). See also id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that allocation of burden of
proof with respect to causation was appropriate “where the employer has created
uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible
criterion”).
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proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
allowed gender to play such a role.”66
As the dissent noted, the plurality’s simultaneous assertions
that an adverse employment decision is “because of” sex as long as
sex was considered by the employer in making the decision and that
an employer is not liable if it ‘can prove that sex was not a but-for
cause of the decision’ cannot both be true.”67
Although the Court faltered in carrying through with the
logical parallel with the multiple sufficient causation doctrine in
Title VII mixed-motive cases, Congress moved swiftly to correct it.
In response to Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII in
1991 to clarify that a plaintiff who establishes that an adverse
employment decision was made because of mixed-motives has
proven discrimination.68 Underlying the 1991 Civil Rights Act was a
recognition that whenever an improper criterion is a motivating
factor in an employment decision, Title VII’s statutory prohibition is
contravened. As amended, Title VII now provides that proof that the
employer would have made the same decision notwithstanding the
improper motive, under the mixed-motive test, may be introduced by
the defendant, but the effect of prevailing is merely to limit the
obligation to pay compensatory damages and backpay.69 A plaintiff
who establishes that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
66

Id. at 244-245. Of some significance to the argument pursued here, in affirming the
propriety of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, Justice O’Connor invoked
earlier jury selection cases as precedent. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 268
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)
(“once the consideration of race in the decisional process had been established, we held
that ‘the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional
action by showing that permissible racially netural selection criteria and procedures have
produced the monochromatic result’”).
67
490 U.S. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Believing that but-for causation was an
essential element of proof of a violation, the dissent went even further and argued that the
plaintiff, rather than the defendant, should carry the burden in a mixed-motive case on
that issue. Id. at 286 (arguing that plaintiff should retain burden of proof, as under
conventional Burdine-type case).
68
See P.L. 102-166, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat 1071. For a discussion of the 1991
Amendments, see Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 584-588 (1996).
69
See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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factors also motivated the practice,” may be awarded declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs.70 With respect
to the liability determination, Title VII now operates under a per se
rule, and the statutory scheme thus expressly acknowledges that a
plaintiff’s proof that an employer’s improper purpose was a
“motivating factor” in an adverse employment action against her is
sufficient to establish a violation.
C. Mixed motive in Batson cases
Batson was decided in 1986, nine years after Mt. Healthy and
Arlington Heights. It was only a matter of time, and a short time at
that, before the mixed-motive problem emerged in the Batson
context. Batson employed a three-step framework to resolve
allegations regarding the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges in jury selection. That framework provides that, at step
one, a party challenging a strike has the burden to make out a prima
facie case that the strike was exercised for a discriminatory
purpose.71 Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the
burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a neutral explanation for
striking the juror.72 If the prosecutor meets that minimal burden, the
analysis then proceeds to a third step, in which the court must
decide, in light of the totality of the facts and evidence, whether the

70

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that defendant can make out a prima facie case “by
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose”) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 (1976)); Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (same). At this stage, the defendant need not prove
discriminatory intent but only point to facts consistent with such illicit intent as to fairly
put the issue into play. Evidence relevant to support a prima facie case includes the fact
that the strike was used against a member of a protected class, the pattern of strikes
exercised by the challenged party, and any other evidence that might support an inference
of discrimination. Once the defendant makes a “prima facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race, . . . the prosecution must offer a raceneutral basis for striking the juror in question.” Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410,
2416 (2005).
72
476 U.S., at 94, (once defendant establishes prima facie case, “burden shifts to the
State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral
justifications for the strikes.); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (explaining
that at step two, “the prosecution must offer a … neutral basis for striking the juror in
question”).
71
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neutral reason proffered by the challenged party was pretextual and
the challenged strike a product of discrimination.73
The framework shares many features with several earlier jury
selection cases that also employed a burden-shifting framework.74 In
Neal v. Delaware,75 for example, the Court found that the fact that no
black jurors had been ever been summoned to serve as a juror in the
State “presented a prima facie case of denial” of equal protection
rights, and the State’s response – that there was not a single black
juror in all the state who possessed the qualifications to serve as a
juror, was a “violent presumption” unworthy of credence. Once a
prima facie case is established, it was recognized, “[t]he burden falls
to the State to refute it.”76 The Court’s jury selection cases have
adhered to this basic analytical structure, holding that statistical or
circumstantial evidence that blacks were being systematically
excluded from jury service constituted “prima facie proof” of a
constitutional violation, and sufficient evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose must be adduced by the government to rebut
the prima facie case.77 Batson’s three-step framework extends and
elaborates upon this procedural structure and marks a continuity
rather than a break in approach.
The mixed-motive problem, of course, arises in Batson when
the proponent of a challenged strike, at step-two, proffers an
explanation that includes both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.
Trial courts facing a mixed-motive explanation have responded in
three different ways. Some have held that when a discriminatory
reason is included among the reasons proffered by the prosecutor to
justify a strike, the prosecutor has failed to satisfy his step two
73

Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at 2324; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005)
(explaining that if the prosecution tenders a neutral explanation, then the issue is properly
joined, and the trial court must proceed to the third step of the inquiry and decide
“whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination” )
(quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 767)
74
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-96 & nn. 18-19 (citing McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, as
well as Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972)).
75
103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881).
76
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 233 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper v.
Mississippi, 251 Miss. 699, 707 (1965)).
77
See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 480.
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burden.78 These courts have reasoned that Batson’s framework
commands that the proponent of a strike come forward with a neutral
explanation, and that any explanation that includes race or gender
simply fails that standard. Under that reasoning, the proper response
to a mixed-motive explanation is to terminate the inquiry and sustain
the objection.79 Other courts have acknowledged the mixed nature of
the explanation, but because not all of the articulated reasons were
improper, have nonetheless proceeded to step three to conduct a
conventional Batson pretext analysis.80 Finally, a third group of
courts have refused to find that an admission of discriminatory
animus constitutes a per se Batson violation. Instead, they have
invoked “mixed motive” or “dual-motivation” analysis, either at the
second step or at the third, to determine whether the strike violates
the Equal Protection Clause.81
78

See, e.g., McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Ind. 2004); State v. Lucas,
199 Ariz. 366, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (2001) (holding that dual motivation analysis in the
Batson context is “inconsistent with the ‘facially valid’ standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Purkett”); Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210
(S.C.1998) (expressly rejecting “dual motivation” analysis and holding that articulation
of one racially-motivated reason requires invalidation); Rector v. State, 213 Ga.App. 450,
444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga.App.1994) (same); Wisconsin v. King, 215 Wis.2d 295, 572
N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis.Ct.App.1997) (“[W]here the challenged party admits reliance on a
prohibited discriminatory characteristic, we do not see how a response that other factors
were also used is sufficient rebuttal under the second prong of Batson.”). cf. Robinson v.
United States, 878 A.2d 1273, 1284 (D.C.,2005) (holding that “even if the prosecutor
acted from mixed motives, some of which were non-discriminatory, his actions deny
equal protection and violate Batson if race or gender influenced his decision. A
peremptory challenge may not be based even partially on an unlawful discriminatory
reason;” but refusing to decide whether “same decision” defense is available to
prosecutor).
79
See, e.g., Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1998) (holding that
regardless of how many other nondiscrimiantory factors are considered, any
consideration of a discriminatory factor directly conflicts with Batson’s purposes and
taints entire jury selection process).
80
See, e.g., Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F.Supp.2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding, on habeas
review, that state court decision “that the second step of the Batson analysis can be met
by articulating both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a strike is not contrary to or
an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent”) (aff’d, Kesser
v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing en banc granted,425 F.3d 1230 (9th
Cir.2005)); Kesser v. Cambra, 2001 WL 1352607 (N.D.Cal. Oct 26, 2001) (aff’d, Kesser
v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing en banc granted,425 F.3d 1230 (9th
Cir.2005)).
81
See cases cited supra nn. 111-116.
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The early court decisions that grappled with the mixedmotives problem generally concluded that a mixed-motive
explanation did not satisfy Batson’s step two requirement to proffer
a “neutral explanation” for a strike. The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals was the first court to expressly confront it, at least in a
published decision.82 In Owens v. State,83 the prosecutor, after
having used fifteen of his 23 strikes against blacks, initially
explained with respect to one of the jurors that the primary reason
for striking the juror was “age and single status.”84 When pressed for
additional reasons by the trial judge, however, he admitted that the
fact that the juror “was the same race as the defendant was a
factor.”85 Based on this admission, the Court concluded that the
prosecutor had not come forward with the neutral explanation
required by step two of the Batson framework, and held that the trial
court’s finding to the contrary was “clearly erroneous.”86 In reaching
this conclusion, the court described the problem as one of “mixed
motive,” but did not directly address the Supreme Court’s mixed
motive cases or the framework suggested in those cases to resolve
the Batson problem.
Shortly after the Alabama Criminal Court decided the Owens
case, two justices of the United States Supreme Court also rejected
the use of mixed motive analysis in the Batson context.87 In
Wilkerson v. Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had
refused to find a Batson violation despite the prosecutor’s admission
that “race was a factor” in his peremptory strike of an AfricanAmerican juror, where race was merely “[o]ne of many
considerations,” and “nothing major.”88 In a dissent to a denial of a
petition for certiorari joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall
82

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unpublished decision, also apparently
invoked mixed motive analysis to uphold a conviction in the face of a Batson challenge
around the same time. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case. See Wilkerson v.
Texas, 493 U.S. 924 (1989).
83
531 So.2d 22, 26 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (“We fail, at this juncture, to see how any
explanation can meet the four articulated requirements if it is based, in part, on race.…”)
84
Id. at 24.
85
Id. at 24.
86
Id. at 26.
87
See Wilkerson v. Texas (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
88
Id.
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argued that a mixed motive explanation “cannot be squared with
Batson’s unqualified requirement that the state offer ‘a neutral
explanation’” for its peremptory challenges.89 In Justice Marshall’s
view, a neutral explanation can only be understood as one based
“wholly on nonracial criteria.”90 Adaptation of the mixed motive
defense in the Batson context, in Justice Marshall’s view, is also
inappropriate “because of the special difficulties of proof” that
would arise.91
At the same time, other Texas courts interpreted Batson to
require strict neutrality.92 As early as 1987, an intermediate appellate
court in Texas concluded that although a prosecutor might articulate
one or more race-neutral reasons along with a non-neutral reason for
striking a minority juror, “a prosecutor's admission that race was an
influencing factor in the selection process vitiates the legitimacy of
the entire procedure.”93 In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
that approach and declared that any consideration of an improper
criterion in jury selection violates equal protection.94 Several state
courts, including Indiana,95 Arizona,96 Georgia,97 South Carolina,98
and Wisconsin,99 have endorsed this “taint approach” and held that
the inclusion of a discriminatory reason in an explanation,
89

Id. at 926.
Id. at 926.
91
Id. at 926.
92
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not followed the State Supreme Court’s lead,
and has rejected the taint approach in favor of mixed-motive analysis. See Guzman v.
State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). For a discussion of the battle
among Texas’s courts over the mixed motive issue, see Ross P. Brooks, Mixed Messages:
Texas' Two Highest Courts Deliver Conflicting Opinions Regarding The Fourteenth
Amendment Mixed Motive Doctrine As Applied In The Context Of Batson/Edmonson
Juror Exclusion Hearings, 6 SCHOLAR 311 (2004); Geoffrey A. Gannaway, Texas
Independence: The Lone Star State Serves as an Example to Other Jurisdictions as it
Rejects Mixed-Motive Defenses to Batson Challenges, 21 REV. LITIG. 375 (2002)
(reviewing Texas law prior to the en banc decision in Guzman).
93
Speaker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987);
McKinney v. State,761 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988) (quoting
Speaker, 740 S.W.2d at 489).
94
See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991).
95
McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108 (2004).
96
Arizona v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
97
Rector v. Georgia, 213 Ga. App. 450, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1994).
98
South Carolina v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805, 811 (2001).
99
Wisconsin v. King, 215 Wis.2d 295, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
90
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“regardless of how many other nondiscriminatory factors” are also
proffered, “taints the entire jury selection process.”100
This early momentum came to an abrupt halt, however, with
the Second Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Senkowski.101 For better
or worse, the Howard case has proved tremendously influential in
shaping the debate over mixed motive. The facts in Howard are
similar to those in Owens and Wilkerson. Howard was tried in a
New York state court for various charges, including robbery, in
1984, prior to the Batson decision. During jury selection, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor used peremptory
strikes to remove the only two black jurors from the venire. The
motion was denied and Howard was convicted by an all-white jury.
While his appeal was pending, Batson was decided. Finding that a
prima facie case of discrimination was established, the state
appellate court remanded Howard’s case for an evidentiary hearing
to determine the reasons for the strikes.102
At the hearing, the prosecutor candidly admitted that race was
a factor in his decision to strike the black jurors. He contended,
however, that “race had not been an ‘overriding’ or a ‘major’
factor,”103 and stated that he also took into account several neutral
factors, including that one of the jurors seemed to lack a sufficient
education, and the other juror had limited work experience,
expressed no views on an important issue in the case, had no
connection to law enforcement, and because of her five children,
might be sympathetic to the defendant.104 Applying the three-step
pretext analysis from the Title VII case Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,105 the state courts concluded that
Howard failed to establish purposeful discrimination.106 Although
100

Arizona v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). The theory
was developed in several intermediate Texas appellate court opinions. See Moore v.
Texas, 811 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex.Ct.App. 1991) (holding that “[e]ven though the
prosecutor may have given one racially neutral explanation, the racially motivated
explanation "vitiates the legitimacy of the entire [jury selection] procedure").
101
986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).
102
Id.
103
986 F.2d at 25.
104
Id. at 25.
105
450 U.S. 248, 248 (1981)
106
Id. at 26.
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the Second Circuit found the state court’s analysis too forgiving, it
also declined to endorse the taint approach to mixed motive cases.
On the one hand, it reasoned, the state applied the wrong legal
standard because the question in such a case is not about pretext; it is
not “the all-or-nothing question of whether or not an impermissible
consideration motivated the challenged action.”107 Because the
challenger has satisfied his burden to prove improper motivation,
Burdine’s three-step framework is moot. On the other hand, the
court declined to observe a per se rule. Invoking Mt. Healthy and
Arlington Heights, the court held that “[o]nce the claimant has
proven improper motivation, dual motivation analysis is available to
the person accused of discrimination to avoid liability by showing
that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the
improper motivation that the claimant has proven.”108 Accordingly,
the Second Circuit held, “Howard was entitled to prevail unless,
under dual motivation analysis, the prosecutor could sustain his
burden of showing that he would have exercised his challenges
solely for race-neutral reasons”109 and remanded the case for analysis
under that standard. 110
The approach endorsed by the Second Circuit in Howard111
has subsequently been adopted by several other federal circuit courts
of appeals, including the Third,112 Fourth,113 Eighth,114 Ninth,115 and
Eleventh.116 Although the current trend unmistakably favors an
embrace of mixed motive analysis, an equal number of federal
107

Id.
Id. at 27.
109
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
110
Id. at 30.
111
The Second Circuit affirmed Howard in two subsequent cases. See U.S. v. Brown, 352
F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1996).
112
Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 2002)
113
Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995)
114
U.S. v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024
(8th Cir. 2001);
115
Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004) (opinion vacated and en banc
rehearing held).
116
King v. Moore (11th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Tokars (11th Cir. 1996); Wallace v. Morrison
(11th Cir. 1996). Although the Seventh Circuit has not yet adopted mixed motive
analysis, Judge Cudahy opined that it should in a concurring opinion. See Holder v.
Welborn, 60 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 1995).
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circuit courts, numerous state courts,117 and the Supreme Court itself
have all yet to address its permissibility.118 In this Article, I argue
that the turn to mixed motive in the Batson context is a mistake that
threatens to undermine whatever safeguards Batson provides against
discriminatory jury selection. As I argue below, a different approach
is necessary to safeguard the minimal gains achieved in Batson’s
two-decade reign.
II. BATSON, NEUTRALITY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
More than 100 years before Batson was decided, the Supreme
Court declared that the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of jurors
on account of race,119 and in case after case, the Court has reaffirmed
that principle.120 Thus, jurors may not be excluded from jury service
because of an illicit criteria. But what does the slippery term
“because of” mean in the peremptory strike context, in which
traditionally jurors can be excluded “for any reason, or no reason”?121
What if a juror was struck because of neutral and improper
criteria?122 Can such an explanation be considered “neutral”? Does
117

See, e.g., People v. Schmeck, 37 Cal.4th 240, 276, 118 P.3d 451, 476 (2005) (noting
that California state courts have not resolved “whether a mixed-motive peremptory
challenge could constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights”).
118
In addition, some of those that have affirmed, under the highly deferential habeas
review standards mandated by 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), a state’s use of mixed motive, have
either implicitly or expressly reserved any judgment regarding whether Batson is best
read to permit mixed motive, should the issue arise on direct review. See, e.g., Gattis v.
Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 225 (holding that “state courts’ application of ‘dual motivation’
analysis to Gattis’ Batson challenge did not result in a decision that was ‘contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, Federal law”).
119
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880).
120
See, e.g., Strauder v. W. Virgina, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte State of Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879), Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442 (1900); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 n.1 (1965) (collecting cases); Batson, 476 U.S. at
84 n.3 (collecting cases).
121
U. S. ex rel. Darcy v. Handy 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956) (noting that peremptory
challenges give each party “discretion to exclude jurors deemed objectionable for any
reason or no reason.”). For a historical overview of the evolution of jury selection
challenges, see William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1406-1416 (2001) (tracing history beginning with English
law from 1100s and early 1200s through contemptory American practice).
122
As a review of the mixed motive cases indicates, the mixed motive problem has arisen
where prosecutors have admitted that race or sex was a “factor,” or where they struck a
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the fact that at least one of the reasons proffered by the proponent of
the strike suffice to satisfy the step two burden? As will be
discussed below, fundamental equal protection principles preclude
that conclusion.
juror because they “preferred” a jury with a different racial or gender composition, or
where they feared that a common racial or sex characteristic between the juror and the
defendant might create bias. In Howard v. Senkowski, for instance, the prosecutor
admitted that race was “a factor” in the decision to strike, because he believed it “made
them sympathetic to the defendant,” but alleged that other factors, including the
prospective jurors’ education and intelligence, limited work experience, and five
children, were more important considerations. 986 F.2d at 25. In Gattis v. Snyder, the
prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against an elderly African-American male.
The prosecutor there gave two reasons for the strike, one of which was based on gender.
First, the prosecutor pointed to what he considered to be “very conservative” views
regarding “application of the death penalty.”278 F.3d at 232. Second, he stated that the
juror was “an older gentleman,” and noting the presence of several other older gentlemen
on the jury panel, stated that “we would prefer to have some more women on the jury.”
Id. at 232. In United States v. Darden, the prosecutor gave two reasons for striking a
female African-American juror. First, he stated his belief that “young black females …
tend … to be more sympathetic toward individuals who are involved in narcotics.” 70
F.3d at 1530-1531. He also stated that he struck the juror because she “said virtually
nothing” during the voir dire and thus he believed her to be “either naïve or withholding
information,” or to have “virtually no experience with the criminal justice system.” 70
F.3d at 1530-1531. In Weaver v. Bowersox, the prosecutor stated that he struck an
African-American female juror “for a number of reasons,” including her hesitation in
answering questions about the death penalty and lack of eye contact. He also added that,
“in any event, I was not persuaded that she could give the death penalty, particularly to a
fellow black person,” and observed that she was “cutting up and talking to the black
gentleman next to her.” 241 F.3d at 1027. In King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th
Cir. 1999), the prosecutor proffered the following explanation for striking an AfricanAmerican female: “Okay. She is a young black female[;], the Defendant is a young black
male. Her response to the Court’s inquiry with regard to her feelings aobut the death
penalty we felt were sufficient for us to have concern about how she would apply the
law.” In Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 1996), the prosecutor was
asked by the trial judge if he “consider[ed] race in striking these ones that you struck, the
black ones you struck?” The prosecutor responded by explaining that he used a rating
system to assign numbers to prospective jurors, and added “[r]ace was a factor that I
considered just as I considered age, just as I considered their place of employment and so
on.” In Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004), the prosecutor exercised
peremptory strikes against all three native Americans on the venire. When called to
explain his strike of the first juror, he stated that “[m]y experience is that native
Americans who are employed by the tribe are a little more prone to associate themselves
with the culture and beliefs of the tribe than they are with the mainstream system,” and
“they are sometimes resistive” and “suspicious” of the criminal justice system. He also
gave several additional, neutral reasons for striking the juror, including that she seemed
to him to be pretentious, emotional, from a dysfunctional family, and “fairly weak.”
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A. The Meaning of “Neutrality” at Batson’s Step Two

In Hernandez v. New York, the Court made clear that the
question at step two is narrow: an explanation is “neutral” as long as
there is no literal admission of purposeful discrimination. A strike
may be exercised for reasons that closely correlate with race, as long
as the reason is not itself race, and a strong conceptual linkage
between the reason and the race or ethnicity of the juror is not
enough. A step two explanation is legally “neutral,” according to
Hernandez, “unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation.”123 Because the explanation offered by the
prosecutor did not literally turn on the race or ethnicity of the
bilingual jurors, the proffered explanation satisfied the neutrality
requirement.
The Court revisited the step-two inquiry four years later in
Purkett v. Elem,124 where two black men were struck purportedly
because of their beards and goatees.125 In reversing the Eighth
Circuit’s finding that the prosecutor had failed to adduce a reason
that satisfied Batson’s second step, the Court underscored that the
burden at step two was purely one of production, not persuasion.
Elem interpreted the step-two burden as setting forth what is in effect
a pleading standard rather than an evidentiary standard. To satisfy
its burden of production, the proponent of a strike need not proffer
an explanation that is credible to survive scrutiny, and at step two,
the trial court should not be concerned with whether the tendered
explanation is “persuasive, or even plausible.”126 That evaluation
takes place at step three.127 In construing step two in this manner, the
Court did no more than follow its Title VII jurisprudence, where it
already had declared that, at step two of the comparable McDonnellDouglas/Burdine framework, a Title VII “defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the [proffered]
123

Id.
514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
125
514 U.S. at 766.
126
Id. at 768.
127
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that proposition in Johnson v. California, 125
S. Ct. 2510 (2005) (noting that “even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly
nonsensical justification for its strike, the case does not end—it merely proceeds to step
three”).
124
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reasons.”128 After Elem, courts are not authorized to terminate a
Batson inquiry as long as the prosecutor provides a facially-neutral
explanation. But Hernandez and Elem did not eliminate step two
altogether, nor as some commentators argue, did they necessarily kill
Batson.129
The Court in Elem was quick to point out that although
facially-neutral explanations satisfy the step two burden,
“implausible or fantastic explanations may (and probably will) be
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”130 Elem, in other
words, defers scrutiny rather than prohibits it. Such a reading is
consistent with Batson’s obvious intent to create practically
enforceable evidentiary rules. After all, Batson was handed down
largely in recognition that the Swain regime131 had failed effectively
128

Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248 (1981). In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court devised a set forth a three-step burden-shifting framework to help
lower courts resolve the evidentiary inquiry mandated by Title VII. The purpose of this
procedural mechanism was to determine whether the plaintiff has established that the
adverse employment action was taken “because of” a discriminatory purpose. See Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff
“must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the complainant succeeds in
establishing a prima facie case, the “burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id. Finally, if
the employer comes forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the Court must
determine whether the complainant can show that the employer’s stated reason for
rejection “was in fact pretext.” Id. at 804. This framework was affirmed again in
Burdine. 450 U.S. 248. As a matter of logic, a finding that the proffered explanation was
pretextual does not necessitate a conclusion that the challenged action was the product of
discrimination. It is entirely possible that the defendant will articulate a false explanation
for a challenged action to hide a permissible (although embarrassing or irrational)
purpose rather than an impermissible one. Acknowledging this possibility, the Supreme
Court held in concluded in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993),
that the plaintiff in a Title VII case bears a greater burden than merely proving pretext;
she must also prove that the pretextual explanation masked a discriminatory purpose.
Explaining that its Title VII “decisions concerning ‘disparate treatment’” have “explained
the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, Batson
adapted the formal structure of Title VII to the jury-selection context.
129
See, e.g., Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical
Tragedies in the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 372
(1998) (asserting that “[t]he Elem opinion in many ways renders useless the ten years of
Batson jury selection jurisprudence”).
130
514 U.S. 765, 768.
131
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).

31

MIXED MOTIVES

to stop the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and its
authors no doubt intended courts to apply its requirements to provide
effective enforcement of the non-discrimination principle.132
Although Elem bars any searching credibility determinations at step
two with respect to the plausibility of the explanation offered, Elem
does not disturb the conditional nature of the Batson framework,
which has always required the state to carry its burden of production
before the inquiry may properly proceed to step three.133 Although a
neutral explanation remains legally sufficient even if it is “silly or
superstitious,”134 it must nonetheless be free of any inherent
discriminatory intent,135 that is, the proponent of a challenged strike
still must come forward with an explanation for the strike that does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.136 Elem’s
creation of a strict pleading standard heightens the importance of the
criteria used to assess the legal neutrality of a proffered explanation.
Ultimately, whether or not an explanation proffered at step two is
sufficient depends on the governing equal protection standards. It is
to those standards we now turn.
B. Neutrality and Equal Protection
Modern equal protection law is grounded in the requirement,
established in Washington v. Davis,137 that an equal protection
132

Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93 (noting that decision to overturn Swain was necessary
because the Swain’s requirement that challengers adduce proof of repeated striking of
blacks over many cases had erected a “crippling burden of proof” that rendered
“prosecutors’ peremptory challenges … largely immune from constitutional scrutiny”).
133
514 U.S. at 767 (explaining that “if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial
court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved
purposeful racial discrimination”) (emphasis added).
134
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
135
Id. at 768, citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(neutral explanation is one “based on something other than the race of the juror”); id. at
374 (O’Connor, J., concurring opinion) (“Batson’s requirement of a race-neutral
explanation means an explanation other than race.”)
136
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (“At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the
facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.”). Cf. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (explaining
that in Title VII case, a defendant only carries his burden of production at step two if
“[t]he explanation provided … [is] legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant.”)
137
426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Davis decision has been described by commentators as “the
most important equal protection case of the last quarter-century.” See Ian F. Haney
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violation can not be established absent proof of purposeful
discrimination.138 Arguably the most important equal protection
decision of its time, Davis definitively established that disparate
impact evidence alone is insufficient to establish an equal protection
violation.139 But government decisions, whether made by a group or
an individual, are often made for multiple reasons. If a government
action does not violate the equal protection clause unless it can be
tied to a discriminatory purpose, how important must that purpose
be? Must it be the sole, or dominant, aim or purpose?140
Relying largely on tort standards,141 Arlington Heights
supplied an answer, clarifying that Davis’s requirement that
disparate impact be linked to a discriminatory purpose does not
mean that the discriminatory purpose must be the “sole” motivation
for the challenged action before a violation will be found. A long
line of precedents utilized language that suggested that
discrimination only occurs where the sole purpose of the actor was
Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1832 (2000); K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domain of
Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 525, 538 (2001).
138
In Swain itself, the Court had emphasized this point. See 380 U.S. at 205 (noting that
“purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted. It must be proven.”)
(internal cites omitted).
139
In Davis, a group of unsuccessful black applicants to the District of Columbia police
department alleged that a qualifying test administered to applicants disproportionately
disqualified blacks and therefore ran afoul of equal protection. The Court rejected the
claim. Id. at 240 (basic equal protection principles require “that the invidious quality of a
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose”).
140
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (arguing against judicial review of
legislative motives in part because it is “difficult or impossible for any court to
determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of
legislators”). The Supreme Court’s equal protection cases reflect a longstanding attempt
to cabin the reach of the clause by targeting only state action that is intended “solely” to
disadvantage minorities.
141
The rule established in Washington v. Davis itself, that precludes an equal protection
violation from prevailing absent evidence of “invidious intent,” might itself be
understood as based on common law tort principles. See Pillai, supra note 142, at 530
(“It may be argued plausibly that the Davis rule reflects the venerable common law
tradition of not subjecting a party to liability without establishing causation and
culpability,” thereby operating in a manner analogous to “rules of criminal law or tort
litigation.”). See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 & n.7 (noting that the words in Title
VII “‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,” and that Congress had expressly
rejected an amendment to the statute that would have accomplished precisely that).
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invidious.142 But the Equal Protection Clause does not require such a
strong showing. As the Court explained, “[r]arely can it be said that
a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate
made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a
particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”143 The
reasoning mirrors language from the Second Restatement of Torts,
which states that “[i]t is not necessary that it be the cause, using the
word ‘the’ as meaning the sole and even the predominant cause.”144
If the discriminatory purpose need not be the “sole” or
predominant purpose, then to what extent must the discriminatory
purpose factor in the decision? The Court’s answer again tracked
general causation principles borrowed from the law of tort.
According to the Restatement, an actor’s conduct is a legal cause of
harm to another where that conduct is a “substantial factor in

142

See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (explaining that it is a
violation of the equal protection clause to compel “a colored man to submit to a trial for
his life by a jury drawn from the panel from which the State has expressly excluded every
man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects”);
(Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) holding that “[w]henever by any action of a
state, whether through its Legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or
administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of
their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of
the African race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment”); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (quoting Carter);
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (same); Swain, 380 U.S. at 830 (denying that
“purposeful discrimination based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing that
an identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%”) (emphasis
added)
143
429 U.S. at 265.
144
REST 2d TORTS § 430 (d) (“In order that a negligent actor may be liable for harm
resulting to another from his conduct, it is only necessary that it be a legal cause of the
harm. It is not necessary that it be the cause, using the word "the" as meaning the sole and
even the predominant cause. The wrongful conduct of a number of third persons may also
be a cause of the harm, so that such third persons may be liable for it, concurrently with
the actor.”). See also Jeremiah Smith, supra note 28, at 311 (explaining that causal
liability should be sufficient upon a showing that tortious conduct was a substantial factor
in causing the harm, it need not be “the sole factor, nor the predominant factor”). The
Court has invoked this principle repeatedly in its anti-discrimination jurisprudence,
reiterating that “[d]iscrimination need not be the sole cause in order for liability to arise,
but merely a necessary element of the set of factors that caused the decision.” Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 1808 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
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bringing about the harm.”145 A “substantial factor” is one which
would lead “reasonable men to regard it as a cause” of the plaintiff’s
harm.146 Professor Brest similarly had argued that the proper test in
cases in which an unconstitutional motive is alleged requires the
complainant to “establish by clear and convincing evidence that such
an objective played an affirmative role in the decisionmaking
process,” but agreed that he need not “establish that consideration of
the objective was the sole, or dominant” cause of the decision.147
The Arlington Heights Court adopted a comparable standard,
but perhaps because the issue is not, strictly speaking, causation but
purpose, adopted the term “motivating” in lieu of the Restatement’s
“substantial” and Brest’s “affirmative,”148 but with no indication that
the motivating factor test differed materially from the substantial
factor test.149 Although generally “courts refrain from reviewing the
merits” of legislative decisions “absent a showing of arbitrariness or
irrationality, … [w]hen there is proof that a discriminatory purpose
has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference
is no longer justified.”150 Proof of discriminatory purpose, according
to Arlington Heights, is established upon a showing that an
“invidious discriminatory purpose” was “a motivating factor” for the
decision – the plaintiff need not prove that such purpose was the sole
motivating factor, nor even that such purpose had “primacy.”151
145

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 431(a), at 428 (1965).
Id. at Comment (a) to § 431(a), at 429.
147
Brest, supra note 38, at 130-131.
148
In Mt. Healthy, the court used the terms interchangeably. See 429 U.S. 274, 285. See
also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 238 n.2 (1989) (noting that lower courts had
employed a variety of tests, including “motivating,” “substantial,” and “discernible”
factor tests); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Mt. Healthy language using both
terms as synonyms).
149
See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 503-510 (2006) (noting that
various opinions in Price Waterhouse used the terms interchangeably, and that there is no
logical distinction between terms).
150
Id. at 265-266.
151
Id. at 265 n.11. See also Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d at 29 (concluding that the
use of the word “solely” in the Batson opinion should not be read as an indication that a
defendant carried a higher burden of proof in the peremptory challenge context than he
did in any other context in which proof of purposeful discrimination is necessary to
prevail on a claim brought under the equal protection clause). Cf. Brest, supra note 38, at
146
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These principles were further explicated in Personnel
Administrator of Massachussetts v. Feeney,152 a case involving an
equal protection challenge to a Massachussetts’ law that accorded a
civil service hiring preference to veterans. On its face, the veterans
preference was gender-neutral; female veterans were equally entitled
to the preference.153 However, because the vast majority of veterans
are male, the preference clearly had a disparate impact on female job
applicants.154 Conceding that the disparate impact of the preference
was readily apparent to lawmakers, the Court, again consistent with
general tort principles, rejected a standard that would equate
knowledge of disparate impact with purpose to discriminate. Under
general tort principles, it often is “held not to be sufficient that the
actor knew that his conduct was substantially certain to produce the
injury, and it may be necessary that he desired to bring it about.”155
Likewise, the Feeney court acknowledged that given the
foreseeability of the disparate impact on women from the veterans
preference, “[I]t would … be disingenuous to say that the adverse
consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the
sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not
foreseeable.”156 But discriminatory purpose implies “more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies
that the decisionmaker … selected or reaffirmed a particular course
of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”157 Because Feeney could
not demonstrate that the Massachussetts’ preference was the product,
even in part, of a discriminatory purpose, her claim failed.158
Although the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights and Feeney both
failed to prove that legislative or administrative classifications were
intentionally designed to effect a discriminatory purpose, these cases
have been regularly invoked by the Court for the proposition that the
119 n.123 (arguing that rule motivated by legitimate and illegitimate objectives “should
be invalidated if the illict objective played any material role in the decision”).
152
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
153
Id. at 268.
154
Id. at 271.
155
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (i).
156
Id. at 278.
157
Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
158
Id. at 280.
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plaintiff’s proof of discriminatory purpose under Washington v.
Davis does not require the plaintiff to prove that a discriminatory
purpose was the sole or predominant factor in the decision.159 The
relevant question is not whether the challenged action was taken in
part, even in large part, for legitimate motives, but instead whether
the decision was motivated, even in part, by an improper purpose;
that is, whether an invidious discriminatory purpose was “a
motivating factor” in the decision.160
These principles clarify the question of what constitutes an
improper purpose for a peremptory strike, and the Supreme Court
has in fact invoked them for that purpose in its Batson jurisprudence.
In Hernandez, for instance, the Court cited both Washington v.
Davis’s injunction that proof of disparate impact is not enough to
establish an equal protection violation and Feeney’s teaching that the
showing necessary to establish a violation is that the course of action
was at least in part chosen because of the invidious purpose.161 More
recently, in the first of the two Miller-El decisions, the Court
explicitly stated that an objecting party will satisfy his burden under
Batson by demonstrating that race was “a motivating factor” for the
exercise of a peremptory strike.162 Miller-El quite clearly did not
159

See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio 490 U.S. 642, 672-673 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is elementary that a plaintiff cannot recover upon proof of
injury alone; rather, the plaintiff must connect the injury to an act of the defendant in
order to establish prima facie that the defendant is liable. E.g., Restatement § 430.
Although the causal link must have substance, the act need not constitute the sole or
primary cause of the harm. §§ 431-433; cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,490 U.S. 228,
(1989)”); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 272 (1993) (holding
that civil rights statute providing cause of action for deprivation of equal protection, as
applied to anti-abortion protesters, requires proof that invidious purpose “at least in part”
motivated their action in preventing women from obtaining abortions at clinic).
160
Although the general equal protection causation test only requires evidence that the
illicit motive was “a motivating factor,” the Court has not followed this reasoning in its
redistricting cases. In those cases, the Court has required a showing that race was “the
predominant factor” that led to a particular outcome. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 916 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996).
161
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) (emphasis added).
162
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003) (“Even though the practice of jury
shuffling might not be denominated as a Batson claim because it does not involve a
peremptory challenge, the use of the practice here tends to erode the credibility of the
prosecution's assertion that race was not a motivating factor in the jury selection.”); id. at
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demand any proof that the strikes exercised at Miller-El’s trial have
been solely or predominantly the product of invidious intent. In
addition, the lower courts that have sanctioned mixed-motive
analysis have also acknowledged that these principles define
neutrality. Chief among them, the Second Circuit in Howard v.
Senkowski acknowledged that a discriminatory purpose is
established by proof that such a purpose is even a “part of a
motivation,”163 and rejected the proposition that Batson must be read
to require proof that the improper purpose was the “sole motivation”
for the peremptory strike.164
Given that the burden of proving discriminatory purpose is
satisfied upon a showing that an illicit factor was even a partial
consideration by the actor, the contention is foreclosed that a mixedmotive explanation – one that admits that a discriminatory purpose
was part of the motivation for exclusion of the juror – can be deemed
facially valid.165
C. Mixed-Motive Explanations Are Not Neutral
Like Justice Marshall, the state courts that have adopted the
“taint approach” to the mixed-motive problem have recognized that
any approach to a mixed-motive explanation that “does not prohibit
a prosecutor from striking a juror even when the decision is based in
part” on an improper reason “cannot be squared with Batson’s
unqualified requirement that the state offer ‘a neutral explanation’
for its peremptory challenge.”166 A mixed-motive explanation is not
a neutral explanation under the applicable equal protection standards

347 (“The supposition that race was a factor could be reinforced by the fact that the
prosecutors marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror cards.”).
163
986 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1993).
164
Id.
165
See, e.g., Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (concurring
opinion) (arguing that “No "neutral explanation" can serve to rebut the presumption that
the condemned practice of exclusion based on race occurred when the prosecutor admits
that such an exclusion did occur. . . .”) (quoting McKinney, 761 S.W.2d at 551);
166
Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.) (emphasis in original).
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because the prosecutor has in effect admitted that an improper
purpose was “a motivating factor” in her decision to strike a juror.167
The conclusion that a mixed-motive explanation is not neutral
is strengthened by consideration of the nature of the step two
inquiry. As the Court has strongly underscored, step two does not
involve, or even allow, any credibility assessment.168 The strict
injunction on factual assessment at step two virtually eliminates a
court’s discretion to disregard a discriminatory admission. Just as a
court may not dismiss a facially neutral justification as
“implausible,” neither may it pick and choose which among several
proffered reasons to believe, nor choose to credit one articulated
reason but disregard another. To do so would require it prematurely
to weigh the evidence and make precisely those credibility
assessments that the Supreme Court has unambiguously stated are
not appropriate at step two. Instead, the court must assume “that the
proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are [all] true,” and
only then determine if “the challenges violate the Equal Protection
Clause as a matter of law.”169
As noted above, the raison d’etre of the Batson framework is
to answer the question whether the conduct that has a disparate
impact (in this case, the peremptory strike) can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose.
An explanation that includes an
impermissible motive as one of several motives evinces that the
peremptory strike was exercised “at least in part” for a
discriminatory purpose.”170 Such a reason is not neutral – that is, it is
facially inconsistent with equal protection.171
167

See Owens v. State, 531 Slo.2d 22, 26 (concluding that given Batson’s requirements
that a neutral explanation be neutral, related to the case to be tried, clear and reasonably
specific, and legitimate, that it could not “see how any explanation can meet the four
articulated requirements if it is based, in part, on race”). Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 926
(Marhall, J. dissenting from denial of cert.) (“To be “neutral,” the explanation must be
based wholly on nonracial criteria.”) (emphasis in original).
168
See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. 2418 n.7; Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (holding that Court
of Appeals erred by combining Batson’s second and third steps into one”).
169
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359.
170
That conclusion does not follow only if the improper motive was not actually a
“motivating factor” at all in the actual decision. Given the context, that conclusion seems
implausible. After all, when asked to explain why she struck a juror, a prosecutor’s
answer that she did so, in part because of race, is strong evidence that she viewed race as
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Given that a mixed-motive explanation necessarily fails the
step-two neutrality requirement, what is the appropriate response
when such an explanation is proffered? If a “mixed-motive”
explanation is not neutral under the Batson framework, should the
inquiry come to an end? If not, is it necessary, or even permissible,
to move on to step three notwithstanding that the proponent of the
strike has failed to carry her burden?
D. Conventional Pretext Analysis in Mixed Motive Cases
Proceeding to step three in a mixed-motive Batson case, as
some courts have,172 is an error because Batson’s framework was
designed to elucidate whether a discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the decision to exercise peremptory strikes.
Whether the explanation provided by the prosecutor to justify the
strike was truthful or “pretextual,” as Batson’s third step is designed
to elucidate, is simply not the relevant inquiry in a mixed-motive
case. First, it renders superfluous the conditional nature of the
Batson framework, which only directs courts to undertake a factual
assessment if the prosecutor carries her step two burden of
production. If that conditional requirement were ignored, then there
would be no burden at all at step two, which would amount to a
wholesale rewriting of Batson.
Second, moving to step three propels the court toward the
wrong inquiry. In a conventional Batson case, the issue at step three
having some bearing on her conduct. That is, she herself seems implicitly to be
acknowledging that race was at least one of several causal factors in her decision.
Presumably, if race really was superfluous to her decision, she would not have felt
compelled to include it in her explanation.
171
See, e.g., Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (concurring
opinion) (stating that “equal protection is denied whenever race is a factor in the exercise
of a peremptory challenge. This "bright line" rule is necessary because one simply cannot
articulate a "race-neutral" explanation for exercising a peremptory strike when race is a
part of that explanation. But see id., 827 S.W.2d at 869 (plurality opinion) (rejecting
“bright-line” rule urged by concurring opinion in favor of mixed-motive approach).
172
See, e.g., Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F.Supp.2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding, on habeas
review, that state court decision “that the second step of the Batson analysis can be met
by articulating both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a strike is not contrary to or
an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent”) (aff’d, Kesser
v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing en banc granted,425 F.3d 1230 (9th
Cir.2005)); People v. Howard, 128 A.D.2d 804, 513 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.
1987).
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is whether the neutral explanation offered by the prosecutor is
“true.” If it is, then the strike was not the product of a
discriminatory purpose. The party objecting to the strike carries the
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the neutral
explanation was not true, that is, was a pretext for an illicit
purpose.173
Pretext cases and mixed-motive cases thus involve quite
distinct legal issues. In a typical pretext case – for which the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework was devised – the factual
issue to be resolved at step three is whether the facially neutral
reasons articulated by the defendant at step two were the “real”
reasons for the adverse employment decision, or whether they are
more likely than not a “pretext” for the “true” discriminatory
reason.174 That is not the case once an illicit motive has been
admitted or proved. As the plurality in Price Waterhouse explained,
“[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate motives … it simply makes no sense to ask whether the
legitimate reason was ‘the true reason’ for the decision—which is
the question asked by Burdine.”175 After all, it very well may be true
in a mixed motive case (indeed, it is presupposed) that the legitimate
reasons played a part in the employer’s decision. At most, what is at
issue is whether the employer still would have made the decision in
the absence of the illegitimate consideration.
The dispositive issue in a mixed-motive case is not whether
or not the actor harbored a discriminatory purpose, per Washington
v. Davis, but whether that purpose had a causal effect. The
truthfulness of any other, neutral justifications asserted by the actor
is still relevant; after all, if those reasons prove to be pretextual (that
is, they were invented to cover up for the “true” illegitimate purpose)
then there is no possible doubt that the impermissible reason
173

As the Howard court itself recognized, the central question in a pretext case is whether
the facially neutral explanation proffered by the challenged party was the “real” reason
for the exercise of the strike, or rather was merely a pretext for the illicit, discriminatory,
purpose. See 986 F.2d at 27.
174
See, e.g., Robert W. Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 1359, 1383-84 (1990).
175
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion).
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“caused” the adverse action. But proof that the legitimate reasons
were not pretextual does not resolve the causation question, it merely
complicates it.
Because mixed-motive cases are conceptually distinct from
pretext cases, where the proponent of a challenged strike proffers a
mixed-motive explanation, it is error to proceed to a conventional
pretext analysis. Those who have argued that anything but
adherence to the conventional Burdine framework is contrary to the
well-established principle that the plaintiff carries the ultimate
burden to prove purposeful discrimination,176 have misunderstood
that a plaintiff who has established mixed motives has already
carried that burden.
As Justice O’Connor noted in Price
Waterhouse, once a plaintiff has established this much, she has
“taken her proof as far as it could go.”177
The question, then, is not whether a mixed-motive
explanation should be subjected to standard pretext analysis, but
whether the mixed-motive principles used in other contexts should
be invoked to give the prosecutor an opportunity to save a
peremptory strike notwithstanding her failure to carry her burden at
step two. In affirming the applicability of mixed-motive analysis,
the Second Circuit in Howard wholly failed to consider whether a
showing that an improper purpose was a motivating factor for a
strike was sufficient to terminate the Batson inquiry, or whether the
use of mixed motive in the Batson context was consistent with
Batson’s underlying purposes. If, as Howard recognized, it would
be error to conduct a conventional pretext analysis,178 as will be
demonstrated below, it is equally erroneous to turn to mixed motive
to resolve the causation question.
III.

MIXED MOTIVE UNDERMINES BATSON

In Howard, the Second Circuit found it appropriate to use
mixed-motive analysis because it concluded that such analysis had

176

See Price Waterhouse, (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178
986 F.2d at 27 (noting once the claimaint has proven improper motivation, there is no
further need for “pretext” analysis).
177
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been implicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Citing Mt. Healthy
and Arlington Heights, it contended that:
In the realm of constitutional law, whenever
challenged action would be unlawful if improperly
motivated, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
the challenged action is invalid if motivated in part by
an impermissible reason but that the alleged offender
is entitled to the defense that it would have taken the
same action in the absence of the improper motive.179
If the Second Circuit’s sweeping assertion that a single
standard has been utilized in all constitutional cases in which
motivation is an issue were true, then the Second Circuit’s resort to
mixed-motive in Howard might be more defensible. But a single
standard has never been uniformly employed. In the redistricting
context, for example, a plaintiff must prove not only that race was a
“substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the legislature’s choice
of a district’s contours, but that it was the “predominant” factor.180
That is, not only was it the “but-for” cause of the particular lines
drawn by the legislature, but that other neutral concerns were
“subordinated” to achieve the challenged outcome.181 Thus, in Bush
v. Vera, a redistricting case that the Court acknowleded involved
“mixed motives” – the districts challenged in Vera were drawn to
produce “minority-majority” districts and to protect incumbents –
the plaintiffs’ proof that race influenced the shape of the district was
held to be insufficient to require strict scrutiny.182 Instead, the
179

Id. at 26.
Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff's burden is to show, either
through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.”)
181
Id. (“To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.”)
182
Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (“The appellants concede that one of Texas'
goals in creating the three districts at issue was to produce majority-minority districts, but
they also cite evidence that other goals, particularly incumbency protection (including
protection of “functional incumbents,” i.e., sitting members of the Texas Legislature who
180
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plaintiffs were obligated to prove that race was the “predominant”
motive. In dissent, Justice Thomas observed that the court’s test was
substantially stricter than the “but-for” causation standard employed
in other contexts.183 But the unique considerations, both of proof and
purpose, in the redistricting context have long been thought to justify
a different standard.
Choice of a particular threshold standard for application of
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause, therefore, depends
on the context and purpose in which that standard is utilized.184
Whether the same-decision test found appropriate in other
constitutional tort and legislative motive cases should be transferred
to Batson depends on whether that causation standard is appropriate
to the Batson context and furthers its purposes. Certainly, if a
chosen threshold standard conflicts with or undermines the basic
goals in an area of law, as the Court’s redistricting jurisprudence
demonstrates, the chosen standard rather than the goals should give
way. As the Article demonstrates below, mixed-motive analysis
undermines Batson’s expressive function, undercuts its practical
effectiveness, and requires the trial court to engage in counterfactual
speculation for which it is wholly ill-equipped. For all these reasons,
mixed-motive analysis should not be permitted in the Batson
context.
A. Symbolism, Deterrence and Diversity
Batson was intended to “put an end to governmental
discrimination on account of race,”185 and advances that goal in three
ways: it symbolizes official intolerance of discrimination in jury
selection, it seeks to deter such discrimination, and it provides
had declared an intention to run for open congressional seats), also played a role in the
drawing of the district lines.”).
183
Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority that creation of
minority-majority districts does not necessarily require strict scrutiny; doing so “means
that the legislature affirmatively undertakes to create a majority-minority district that
would not have existed but for the express use of racial classifications-in other words,
that a majority-minority district is created “because of,” and not merely “in spite of,”
racial demographics”) (emphasis added).
184
See id., at 1951 (noting that “[u]r precedents have used a variety of formulations to
describe the threshold for the application of strict scrutiny.”)
185
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
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marginal incentives not to strike minority jurors and thus should, in
theory, enhance jury diversity. Of these functions, Batson probably
has served the first most successfully. As a rhetorical device, Batson
and its progeny have sent a strong message to the criminal justice
system that discrimination in jury selection cannot and will not be
tolerated.186 Indeed, the Court has stated that nowhere is the
Fourteenth Amendment’s command to eliminate official racial
discrimination more compelling than in the judicial system, and
Batson was crafted specifically to achieve that goal.187 The
constitutional command to root out discrimination is so overriding
that the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the exclusion of
even a single juror on account of his or her race, ethnicity, or gender
calls it into force.188
Batson serves the function not only of preventing actual
discrimination, but also of abolishing perceived discrimination and
combatting “cynicism” and a loss of “public confidence” in the
criminal justice system.189 Mixed-motive analysis undermines this
symbolic function by tolerating actual discrimination in jury
186

See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1813 (1993) (arguing that the Court
has taken Batson seriously because it “acts as a lightning rod for all of the Court’s
unexpressed concerns about racism in the criminal justice system”); The Supreme Court,
1991 Term; Leading Cases; I. Constitutional Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 244
(asserting that “the Court's extension of Batson to a criminal defendant's exercise of
peremptory challenges stands as a powerful condemnation of race-based judgments in the
courtroom”). Some, however, have argued that Batson’s symbolic message is far
outweighed by its practical failure to restrain discrimination. See Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Batson
line of cases as having merely "great symbolic value" as a demonstration of the court's
"uncompromising hostility to race-based judgments.”)
187
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 415.
188
Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (noting that “‘a single invidiously discriminatory governmental
act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the makign of other
comparable decisions’”); Walker v. Girdich, 410 F.3d 120, 2005 WL 1349916, at *3 (2d
Cir. June 8, 2005) (stating that “under Batson and its progeny, striking even a single juror
for a discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional”). Precisely the same “zero tolerance”
approach has been recognized to underlie statutory anti-discrimination provisions. See,
e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (noting
that the objectives of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “are furthered when
even a single employee establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or
her.”).
189
Id.
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selection, and as such, is inconsistent with the injunction that "racial
discrimination has no place in the courtroom.”190 Permitting the
exclusion of a juror after the prosecutor has admitted a
discriminatory purpose in striking her cannot but contribute to a
belief by a convicted defendant that her conviction was the product
of discrimination.191 Similarly, jurors themselves so excluded are
unlikely to comprehend the subtle distinction between a
discriminatory purpose and a causative factor. Jurors who surmise
the reasons for their exclusion, therefore, undoubtedly will be no less
offended that the prosecutor harbored a discriminatory bias against
them simply because the prosecutor also identified a separate
subjective basis for their exclusion. Likewise, this subtle distinction
is sure to be lost on the general public that learns that blacks, or
women, or other minority members, were excluded from jury service
notwithstanding the prosecutor’s admission that she harbored a
distrust, or dislike, of persons of their group.192
Allowing the mixed-motive defense also sends precisely the
wrong message to prosecutors and judges, who learn that some
invidious intent is tolerable, and that they may even be relatively
candid in admitting or tolerating a discriminatory purpose.
Toleration of intentional misconduct is inconsistent with Batson’s
basic premises, and undercuts its hortatory potential to exert a
positive influence on the conduct of public officials.193
Like Title VII, Batson’s prohibition on discrimination was
crafted to provide a “spur or catalyst” to cause trial lawyers to “selfevaluate” their jury-selection practices “and to endeavor to
190

Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) (“Active discrimination by a prosecutor
during this process condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very
institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury's
neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.”)
192
Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at 2324 (explaining that “the very integrity of the
courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor’s discirmination ‘invites cynicism respecting the
jury’s neutrality,’ and undermines public confidence in adjudication”).
193
See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2023 (1998) (noting that “the Batson rule is to a great extent
hortatory” and courts’ acceptance of dubious Batson explanations “may send a message
to prosecutors and defense counsel that the exclusion of minority jruors is generally not
going to be taken very seriously”).
191
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eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of their discriminatory
tactics.194 In insisting that there be a but-for causal nexus before any
relief is provided, the mixed-motive test works against the goal of
deterrence. The mixed-motive defense permits a prosecutor who has
relied on improper criteria to prevail simply because the prosecutor
was able to demonstrate that there may have been other nondiscriminatory factors that would have led to the “same decision.”
As the Court has noted in the statutory discrimination context, the
identification of discriminatory acts through litigation provides an
important tool by which to attack subterreanean discriminatory
practices and beliefs that may pervade the wider contextual
culture.195 Given that the instance of discrimination targeted in a
particular case is likely reflective of the prosecutor’s general
attitudes and biases, and the likelihood that these same biases will
influence the decisions made by that attorney in future trials,
permitting the proponent of the strike to evade sanction by
persuading the court that the discriminatory motive was not the “butfor” cause of the strike against that individual juror increases the
chances that either that attorney, or other attorneys, will discriminate
against other jurors in the future.196 The end product is a vastly
underprotective regulatory regime.
Batson also serves a diversity-enhancing function. The
exclusion of minority jurors on account of group characteristics
“compromis[es] the representative quality of the jury.”197 In holding
that the free exercise of peremptory challenges must give way to the
194

Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 318 (1982) (quoting Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418 (1975)).
195
See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-359 (1995)
(explaining that enforcement of age discrimination claims is important even absent
showing of but-for causation as to damages, because “[t]he disclosure through litigation
of incidents or practices that violate national policies respecting nondiscrimination in the
work force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of
noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the Act's operation or entrenched
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance”).
196
See Katz, supra note 156, at 519 (explaining that “[s]ocial scientists would predict
that, if undeterred, an employer’s minimually causal utilization of protected
characteristics in one decision will increase the likelihood of future utilization by that
employer, as well as future utilization by other employers”).
197
476 U.S. at 87 n.8.
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antidiscrimination principle, Batson signalled that the traditionally
unfettered common law/statutory right to peremptory challenges is
subordinate to equal protection’s constitutional command. By
prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes, Batson demanded, in
essence, that certain otherwise rational generalizations be ignored or
disabled to serve the larger goal of ensuring minority representation
in the criminal justice system. Batson thus created what some have
described as a “special rule of relevance”198 that functions as a kind
of “affirmative action” for the purpose of overcoming entrenched
racial discrimination.199 Under Batson, minorities receive special
protection against arbitrary removal from the venire. Everything
else being equal, prosecutors have an incentive to strike nonminority jurors rather than minority jurors simply to avoid the
chance that the defendant might prevail on a Batson motion.200
Batson thus contributes at the margins to expand minority
participation in the criminal justice system. Both in preventing
discrimination in jury-selection, and in affirmatively discouraging
the exclusion of minority jurors, Batson furthers the goal of
enhancing the diversity of juries.
Mixed-motive analysis, however, diminishes the ability of
courts to reinforce the representational quality of juries. Indeed, the
use of mixed-motive analysis may represent a conscious judicial
design to diminish the affirmative-action effects of the Batson rule.201
In crafting burden-shifting and causation rules under Title VII, the
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that these rules were
intended to countermand “the risk that employers will be given
198

See J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing Batson as
establishing “‘a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for,
rather than a statement of fact’”) (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941942, 107 S.Ct. 423, 424-425, 93 L.Ed.2d 373 (1986) (opinion concurring in denial of
certiorari).
199
Nesson, supra note __, at 8.
200
Title VII created precisely the same dynamic. See Belton, supra note __, at 1379
(discussing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) & Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989)).
201
See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 1359, 1364 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions dealing with
causation and burden-shifting doctrines were the product of the conservative majority’s
“fundamental objection to affirmative action in any form”).

MIXED MOTIVES

48

incentives to adopt quotas or to engage in preferential treatment.”202
As with other forms of affirmative action, the application of mixedmotive principles to Batson would have the effect of neutralizing, at
least in part, its progressive purposes.
Whatever the ideological motivation behind its adoption,
practically speaking, mixed motive analysis has tended to insulate
discriminatory jury selection tactics from reversal. Although every
Circuit that has permitted mixed motive analysis in Batson cases has
also recognized the necessity of shifting the burden of proof to the
proponent of the challenged strike, and has acknowledged that the
legal issue in the mixed-motive analysis is but-for causation, several
courts have applied the but-for analysis in a sloppy or superficial
manner to avoid reversing convictions, demonstrating the ease with
which the mixed-motive test lends itself to the deconstruction of
Batson’s already skimpy armament.203 In addition, cases remanded
for the purpose of conducting a mixed-motive analysis have
typically resulted in affirmance, suggesting that the mixed-motive
framework performs little more than a rubber-stamping function.204
202

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming state court’s denial
of Batson motion where prosecutor proffered mixed-motive explanation and state court
did not apply the burden-shifting framework specified in Mt. Healthy, based on its
“interpretation” of the trial court’s findings as implicitly satisfying the standard); Wallace
v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1996) (making implicit findings that state court had
made necessary factual findings under correct legal standard, notwithstanding that state
court did not in fact apply correct burden-shifting framework). At least one court has
further placed the burden on the defendant not only to raise the initial Batson objection,
but also specifically to argue for the application of the mixed-motive standard in order to
preserve the claim on appeal. This reasoning appears inconsistent with the status of the
mixed-motive defense as an “affirmative defense,” which normally when not raised by
the party that is entitled to the defense are deemed waived. See State v. Hodge 248
Conn. 207, 226, 726 A.2d 531, 544 (Conn., 1999) (declining to consider dual motivation
claim on appeal where defendant asserted in trial court only that “the reasons articulated
by the state's attorney compelled the conclusion that the state’s attorney had engaged in
purposeful discrimination” and the “trial court expressly found that the reasons given by
the state's attorney for striking the six minority venirepersons were not pretextual”).
204
The number of cases in which a court on remand finds that the challenged party
carries its burden to prove that it would have made the “same decision” vastly
outnumbers the cases in which the challenging party prevails. See, e.g., Doyle v. Mt.
Healthy Bd. of Ed., 670 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1979) (affirming finding that Board would have
dismissed Doyle even had it not considered his exercise of protected speech rights);
People v. Howard, 158 Misc.2d 739, 601 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y.Co.Ct. Jul 28, 1993)
203
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In short, a jury selection process that tolerates discriminatory
bias in any form does not clearly and unmistakably communicate the
message that such discrimination is unacceptable, nor is it likely to
serve the function of deterring discrimination effectively. Although
as a formal matter, the mixed-motive test is designed to identify
instances in which the discriminatory purpose did not matter (in the
sense that it did not affect the ultimate result), the message mixed
motive sends to the larger community is likely that racism and
sexism just “don’t matter.”
B. Easing the “Crippling Burden of Proof”
Not only does mixed-motive analysis undercut Batson’s
expressive functions and deterrent goals, it erects new evidentiary
hurdles. Batson’s framework was developed specifically to address
the “practical difficulties of proving that the State systematically has
exercised peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on
account of race.”205 As the Court explained, Swain’s requirement
that proof of abuse of the peremptory challenge over a number of
cases was necessary to establish a constitutional violation “placed on
defendants a crippling burden of proof.”206 As a result, under Swain,
a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges remained “largely immune
from constitutional scrutiny.”207 Batson directed courts to abandon
the focus on the systematic practices of the prosecutor and permits a
finding of an equal protection violation based on the prosecutor’s
conduct in the instant case alone.
Notwithstanding this focus on efficacy, Batson has been
severely, and rightfully, criticized for failing to erect an adequate

(finding on remand that prosecutor would have made “same decision” to strike juror
notwithstanding admission that “race was a factor”). But see Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 737 F.Supp. 1202 (1990) (affirming judgment for Hopkins under mixedmotive standard ) (aff’d, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (1990)).
205
476 U.S. at 93 n.17. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at
2426 (noting that Batson was decided in wake of recognition that “Swain’s demand to
make out a continuity of discrimination over time … [was] difficult to the point of
unworkable”).
206
476 U.S. at 92.
207
476 U.S. at 92-93.
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barrier against purposeful discrimination.208 After all, to sustain her
burden of production at step two, the proponent of a strike need not
articulate a good reason, but only one that is not itself facially
discriminatory.209 As Justice Marshall observed in his Batson
concurrence, “any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral
reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to
second-guess those reasons.”210 The relative ease with which a party
intent on discriminating can conjure up a neutral explanation for a
strike helps explain why so few Batson challenges succeed.211
Mixed-motive analysis further undermines Batson’s objective of
easing the evidentiary burden of proving discrimination.
1. Lack of Evidence
Batson challenges occur in a virtual evidentiary vacuum -there is extremely little evidence available even in a full-blown
Batson hearing that sheds much real light on the question of whether
an explanation is credible. But the evidentiary problems are greatly
compounded if a Court, allowing the mixed-motive defense, must
also decide whether an improper purpose was the but-for cause of
the prosecutor’s decision to strike the juror. Aside from the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the objecting party as the prima
facie case, the primary evidence, and sometimes the only evidence,
will be the prosecutor’s own explanation for her conduct – the
objective validity of which is open to obvious attack. As one judge
observed, “no prosecutor worth his salt is going to come right out”
and admit an intent to discriminate.212 It is invariably difficult for
208

See Developments in the Law – Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1472, 1581 (1988) (noting that under Batson, “the prosecutor can easily articulate a nonrace based reason for her peremptory challenges - and often a reason that is difficult for
trial judges to assess.").
209
See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)
210
476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). Indeed, as one commentator more bluntly
put it, “[i]f prosecutors exist who have read Hernandez and cannot create a ‘racially
neutral’ reason for discriminating on the basis of race, bar examinations are too easy.”
Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challaneges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993).
211
See Melilli, supra note __, at 460 (discussing low success rate of Batson claims in
reported cases from 1986 to 1993 and surmising that low success rate may be because “it
is too easy for the responding party to offer neutral explanations”).
212
Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327, 344 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
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courts to confidently conclude that an attorney’s neutral explanation,
even when the circumstantial evidence suggests otherwise, is a flatout lie. Such a finding extends beyond a mere procedural ruling and
Given the
implicates the attorney in ethical misconduct.213
acknowledged difficulty of identifying outright prevarication, at
minimum, Batson should be construed to provide vigilant and
unyielding protection at least in those few instances where racial or
gender bias is overt.
In a constitutional tort case or an employment discrimination
action, indeed, in any case in which the conduct of an organization,
legislature, or administrative body is challenged, the multiplicity of
actors and the availability of an often extensive record produced
through document discovery and depositions creates the possibility
that evidence of racial bias can be disentangled from the causal
sources of an adverse action. In Title VII cases, “the liberal
discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court,” which
are supplemented “by the plaintiff’s access to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s investigatory files concerning her
complaint,” improve the chances that a plaintiff can meet her
evidentiary burden.214 But such evidence is wholly unavailable in the
context of Batson challenges. Unlike routine civil cases, Batson
disputes “have no pretrial phase: no pleading, no discovery, no
pretrial memoranda,” and “present none of the usual methods for
‘smoking out’ evidence and narrowing disputed issues.”215
The primary evidence available to answer the question at
issue under mixed-motive analysis – whether the “same decision”
would have ensued notwithstanding the improper motive – is the
prosecutor’s own statements. A Batson hearing is not, however,
psychotherapy; attorneys are advocates with partisan objectives. An
attorney’s statements thus must be evaluated in light of their selfserving nature, suggesting that the admission of an improper motive,
as an inculpatory admission, is much more significant than the
213

See Charlow, supra note __; Anderson, supra note __ (noting that Batson objections
involve challenges to the integrity of lawyers).
214
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
215
Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 2229, 2303 n.239 (1995)
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articulation of purportedly neutral reasons. As Justice O’Connor
pointed out in Price Waterhouse, direct evidence of discrimination
has great persuasive force.216 Although attorneys can be expected to
attempt to justify their strikes by stating neutral reasons, an
admission by a prosecutor that race or gender was a motivating
factor is “direct evidence” of a discriminatory motive. Indeed, in a
Title VII case the defendant may not rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie
case “merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of
counsel.”217 Instead, the defendant must produce evidence that
supports his profferred explanation.218 In a Batson dispute, the
“defendant” and “counsel” are one and the same, and Batson does
not obligate the production of any evidence other than the
“articulation” of counsel. In obliterating the distinction in roles,
Batson is at odds with the mixed-motive framework. Mixed motive
analysis in such a context builds a virtual castle of purported factual
inquiry out of nothing but self-serving conjurations.219 As Justice
Marshall argued, “[a] judicial inquiry designed to safeguard a
216

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that
mixed-motive test burden-shifting should occur only upon introduction of direct evidence
of an improper motive); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90, 91 (2003) (holding that Title VII, as
amended, does not require “direct evidence” to prove mixed motive). See also Brest,
supra note 38, at 124 (noting that admissions by the decisionmaker are “the most reliable
evidence of his actual objectives,” especially given “the ease with which one can lie
successfully about one’s motives”).
217
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.9.
218
Id. (“An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice” to rebut the plaintiff’s
prima facie case.)
219
Again, comparison with Title VII cases is instructive. Under Title VII, and unlike the
equal protection context, a plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating that an employment
practice has a disparate impact on a minority group. In Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court held that a plaintiff could not, however, establish
a prima facie case based on statistical evidence of disparate impact alone. Rather, the
plaintiff must also demonstrate that “the disparity they complain of” was caused by a
specific, challenged, employment practice. In explaining why this proof of causation
requirement should not be unduly burdensome on plaintiffs, the Court reasoned that
“liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers’ records in an
effort to document their claims,” as well as administrative regulations that require
employers to maintain records detailing the impact of its “selection procedures” on
employment opportunities of minority group members. Id. at 657-658. Obviously,
persons raising a Batson objection to a peremptory strike lack access to any such
information, and strike proponents are under no comparable regulatory regime to
document their exercise of strikes.
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criminal defendant’s basic constititutional rights should not rest on
the unverifiable assertions of a prosecutor who, having admitted to
racial bias, subsequently attempts to reconstruct what his thought
process would have been had he not entertained such bias.”220
It also is important to acknowledge the context in which the
dispute is played out.221 In a Batson dispute, a minority juror is
struck by the prosecutor under circumstances giving rise to “an
inference” of discrimination.222 The prosecutor is called to explain
the basis for the strike – that is, the alleged wrongdoer is asked the
question, point blank, immediately upon taking the apparently
improper action – “why did you strike this juror?” An answer that
includes illicit criteria seems an implicit concession that the illicit
purpose not only existed but played a causal role as well.
The question “why” did you strike this juror is linguistically
interchangeable with “for what cause” did you strike this juror or
“what caused you” to strike this juror. The prosecutor’s act of
identifying an improper motive itself is proof that the articulated
reason was a “cause” of the strike.223 A mixed-motive case is that
rare exception where the prosecutor candidly, or stupidly, confesses
a discriminatory impulse. Where there is a “smoking gun,”
permitting the strike is a direct affront to basic equal protection
values.224 As one court embracing the taint approach has stated, “[t]o
220

Id. at 927-928.
476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“unadulterated equal protection analysis ius
simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in any particular case”).
222
See Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005) (explaining that step one of Batson
only requires evidence giving rise to inference of discrimination).
223
That separation between cause and motive may be more defensible in other contexts
involving groups or corporate bodies, as is typically the case in employment
discrimination or constitutional tort actions. For instance, although an employee’s
supervisor may have been motivated to recommend termination of the employee by racial
animus, the corporation may be able to demonstrate that the employee would have been
fired anyway as a result of a race-neutral plan to lay off workers. Similarly, some
members of a legislative or administrative body may be motivated to take action based on
a discriminatory animus, but a majority may be shown to have pursued the course of
action for other, legitimate and race-neutral, reasons. In these cases, the identification of
an illicit motive might be conceptually severable from a causal account of the conduct
that rendered the illicit motive superfluous to the outcome.
224
Although the Second Circuit expressed concern that permitting mixed motive might
encourage prosecutors to falsely deny that they were influenced by improper views, see
Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[t]he cynical might
221
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excuse such obvious prejudice because the challenged party can also
articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike would
erode what little protection Batson provides against discrimination in
jury selection.”225
2. Unconscious Discrimination
Not only is the foundation for this inquiry inherently
untrustworthy, there is reason to doubt the capacity of even the most
honest and fully candid attorney to acknowledge, or even
understand, the subconcious or instinctive motivations that prompt
the exercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of relatively
intangible criteria.226 The necessary finding in a case in which the
prosecutor carries his burden under the mixed-motive test – that the
admitted discriminatory bias did not ultimately influence the
decision to strike the juror – presumes that the court can confidently
conclude that the admitted bias was a relatively minor factor. But
the presumption that the discrimination was minimal may be based
on the false perception that what exists is what can be perceived –
like thinking that the iceberg consists solely of what can be viewed
above the waterline, when the vast bulk lies unobserved below.
Even presuming that lawyers are entirely honest and open
about their motivations for striking jurors, there are powerful reasons
to believe that much discrimination occurs at the subconscious level.
Lawyers undoubtedly form negative impressions about potential
jurors based on a wide array of factors, only some of which may be
articulable by the lawyer. Often, the factors that trigger these
negative assessments may be illicit criteria such as race, ethnicity, or
gender. A well-intentioned lawyer may not only be unaware that her
discomfort with a particular juror is racially-based, but would
sincerely deny the allegation. Indeed, believing herself part of the
“liberal” and “tolerant” class, she might be deeply offended by the
suggest that prosecutors will take from our ruling [permitting mixed motive analysis] a
message of caution not to acknowledge that race was a factor in their use of peremptory
challenges even in those instances when it was”), permitting the mixed motive defense in
fact frees prosecutors to retain their biases rather than work to overcome them.
225
Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1998).
226
See Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping And The
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).
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suggestion. To explain her impressions, she might lie even to
herself.227 She would likely identify some other nominally neutral
trait or character on which to pin her unease: it was not his race, but
his age, occupation, education, or general demeanor. He was
“sullen” or “distant.”228 It was the way he answered questions, his
tone of voice, his facial expression, his “lack of connection” with
her, his lack of investment in the community, the cut of his hair, his
bodyweight, his television viewing habits, etc.229 The list is
potentially endless.
The problem, as Justice Marshall observed, is that
“prosecutors’ peremptories are based on their ‘seat-of-the-pants
instincts,” and such instincts may be nothing more than “racial
prejudice.230 “Even if all parties approach the Court’s mandate with
the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to
confront and overcome their own racism on all levels.”231 There is
depressingly little evidence that much progress has been made
toward overcoming subconscious racial bias, and little reason to
hope that it will be anytime soon.
Allowing the prosecutor to preserve a peremptory strike after
she has admitted a discriminatory purpose, based on a belief that the
other “neutral” reasons articulated would have led to the “same
decision,” therefore, is to ignore the very real possibility that those
neutral reasons are the product of the same discriminatory animus
already confessed.232 Mixed motive merely establishes a convenient
227

Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that attorney may even lie to
themselves to convince themselves that their motives are legal) (citing King v. County of
Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493, 501-502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
228
476 U.S. at 106.
229
For a discussion of the problem of inadvertent bias, especially in the workplace, see
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) (discussing
unconscious bias – the inadvertent application of nominally neutral criteria in a
systematically biased fashion).
230
Id.
231
476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J. concurring) (adding that overcoming unconcious racism
was “a challenge I doubt all of them can meet”).
232
See Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note __, at 49 (arguing that “[I]f facial and gender
stereotyping are pervasive, it is not at all clear that one should assume sufficient
independent ‘legitimate’ employer motivation,” and that “because racist and sexist
thoughts are so deeply imbedded in our’cultural belief system,’ the idea that one can
distinguish among such motives … reflects a ‘false dichotomy’”) (quoting Lawrence, The

MIXED MOTIVES

56

fiction by which courts, and lawyers, can pretend that one’s
improper views can somehow be walled off, segregated, and
neutralized.
3. Incentivizing Obfuscation
The availability of the mixed-motive defense also creates
strong incentives for prosecutors to give long, elaborate, and
convoluted explanations for their strikes. A prosecutor who realizes
that she has made a damaging admission can quickly move to rectify
that slip by adding several additional justifications for the strike.
Indeed, prosecutors might find it advisable as a matter of strategy to
provide long-winded explanations of their strikes in every Batson
case. If they do, then every future Batson case will at the least also
be a mixed-motive case.
Encouraging lengthy and disjointed explanations, however, is
flatly inconsistent with Batson. In describing the state’s burden,
Batson emphasized that an adequate step two showing requires more
than a mere pro forma denial of discriminatory intent, an affirmation
of good faith, or an assertion that the prosecutor assumed partiality
because of the jurors race.233 “If these general assertions were
accepted as rebutting a defendant’s prima facie case, the Equal
Protection Clause ‘would be but a vain and illusory requirement.’”234
As the Court explained in the comparable Title VII context, the
burden of production at step two serves a critical litigative function
by “fram[ing] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the

Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 322 (1987)).
233
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. In Johnson v. California, moreover, the Court reaffirmed
the necessity that the strike’s proponent come forward with an explanation,
notwithstanding that Batson’s framework does not demand that a prima facie case
establish that discriminatory intent more likely than not motivated the strike. The reason
that the prima facie case can be satisfied by raising a mere inference of discrimination,
the Court explained, was that the prosecutor’s failure to adduce an explanation for the
strike at step two would be powerful confirmation that the inference of discrimination
was correct. See 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2418 n.6 (2005).
234
476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. at 598).
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plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext.”235
An adequate explanation, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized, must therefore possess two characteristics: it must be a
“‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of [the] ‘legitimate
reasons’” for exercising the strike, and it must be “related to the
Explanations that lack these
particular case to be tried.”236
characteristics fail the basic purpose of burden allocation, which is
“progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination.”237 Like summary denials of
discriminatory intent, long, multi-faceted and disjointed explanations
do anything but sharpen the inquiry, are not clear and reasonably
specific,238 and thus significantly detract from Batson’s purposes.
4. Counterfactual speculation
Finally, the counterfactual nature of the mixed-motive inquiry
poses another daunting obstacle to any meaningful resolution of the
causation question.239 Determining whether one motive was a but-for
cause of a choice is notably more difficult than resolving the
question of whether a given explanation is credible. Under a
235

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-256. The Court also explained that the step two burden
“serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate
reason for the [challenged] action.” Id.
236
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (explaining that
limiting the step two burden to one of production rather than persuasion does not “unduly
hinder” the plaintiff for several reasons, because the defendant still must adduce an
“explanation of its legitimate reasons … [that is] clear and reasonably specific” in order
to afford the plaintiff “‘a full and fair opportunity’ to demonstrate pretext”). The Court
recently reaffirmed these requirements, and noted that to be adequate, an explanation
must have “some basis in accepted trial strategy.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
339 (2003).
237
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.8.
238
Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (2005) (“Although there may be "any
number of bases on which a prosecutor reasonably [might] believe that it is desirable to
strike a juror who is not excusable for cause ..., the prosecutor must give a clear and
reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].")
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20).
239
Assessments of causation are highly intertwined with counterfactual reasoning, and
are subject to change based on changing counterfactual assumptions. See Barbara A.
Spellman and Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual “But For”
and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64
LAW & CONTEMPT. PROB. 241 (2001).
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conventional pretext analysis, the issue before the court is the
historical question of what actual purpose motivated the strike.
Under a mixed-motive analysis, however, the inquiry turns from the
historical to the hypothetical, and the court must undertake the
speculative inquiry not of what happened, but of what would have
happened had the prosecutor not harbored an invidious purpose. The
speculative nature of the “but-for” inquiry has long been apparent to
tort scholars. Although sometimes the facts of a case make it
seemingly easy to say that some consequence would not have
occurred “but-for” some antecedent occurrence, at other times
applying the but-for test “demands the impossible.” As one scholar
noted:
[I]t challenges the imagination of the trier to probe into
a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs. He is
invited to make an estimate concerning facts that
concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to
what might have happened opens the door wide for
conjecture.240
The but-for question in a mixed-motive case requires a court
to engage in pure speculation. Assuming that the neutral reasons
given by the proponent of the strike are credible, to answer the butfor question, a court must first assess whether those reasons would
have impelled the prosecutor to strike the juror or jurors absent the
accompanying wrongful motive. Moreover, the court cannot
responsibly confine its inquiry to an evaluation of the juror or jurors
that were struck, because the probability that a particular juror would
have been struck does not depend solely on the characteristics of that
juror. The decision to strike a juror depends on the comparative
attractiveness of the other jurors in the venire. Therefore, the court
also must consider the prosecutor’s perceptions of the merits and
demerits of all the other jurors who were not struck.241 Of course,
240

Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67 (1956).
These problems may be further accentuated depending on the specific jury-selection
practices used in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 257
(Womack, J., dissentingt) (describing inherent difficulty of speculating whether any
particular jury would have been struck in the absence of discriminatory animus given the
nature of Texas’s “blind struck-jury” system in which all jurors are ranked in one list)
241
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there normally will be no record of those assessments, and thus
(except in the rare case where the neutral reasons given for a strike
are based on truly glaring deficiencies), there is little basis on which
a trial court can accurately assess the but-for question, aside from
relying upon its own intuitive hunches about how jury selection is
unfolding.242 Appellate courts reviewing mixed-motive challenges
will lack even that minimal basis to review the trial court’s ruling.
Given the highly speculative nature of the inquiry, the
tenuous nature of the evidence upon which that inquiry is based, and
the importance of making equal protection principles operative in the
jury selection process, recognizing the mixed-motive defense is
contrary to Batson’s evidentiary goals. Swain’s requirement that an
objecting party adduce proof of a pattern of discrimination was
abandoned precisely because it established an evidentiary hurdle that
was practically insurmountable. Adoption of mixed-motive analysis
in the Batson context, however, replicates these evidentiary hurdles.
IV.RECLAIMING THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
Not only does use of mixed-motive analysis directly
contravene Batson’s primary purposes, the original concerns that
prompted the Court to devise the mixed-motive standard, which
center on the problem of windfall limitation and harmless error, do
not apply to Batson claims. Mixed-motive analysis’s insistence on
“but-for” causation is not appropriate in an antidiscrimination
regime the primary purpose of which is to root out invidious bias
rather than to compensate victims. Instead, Batson and its progeny
are best understood to bar any peremptory strike in which race,
ethnicity, or gender was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor for its
exercise. Such an approach, which represents a modified version of
the “taint theory,” reflects basic equal protection principles, relies
upon traditional causation doctrines from the law of tort, and has
powerful precedent: it is the same approach to mixed-motive that
Congress has specified under Title VII.
242

See Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 927 (denying certiorari) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“But
how is the factfinder to uncover the prosecutor’s intuitive reservations regarding the
unchallenged white jurors? … No record memorializes the prosecvutor’s
contemporaneous justifications for failing to challenge a juror. Moreover, given the
purely subjective nature of peremptory challenges, such a record could not be made.”).
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A. The Logic and Limits of the Title VII Analogy
The roadmap for resolving the mixed-motive problem in
Batson can be found in the solution Congress adopted in the 1991
Civil Rights Act to resolve the mixed-motive problem in Title VII.
Although Justice Brennan made a partial case for using a
“substantial factor” test to determine liability in mixed-motive Title
VII cases, ultimately, the Price Waterhouse court rejected that test in
favor of Mt. Health’s mixed-motive analysis, which allows the
defendant to prevail as long as he can show that the improper motive
was not the but-for cause of the decision. In clarifying that liability
ensues whenever an employer relies upon a prohibited criterion in
making an employment decision, regardless of whether or not the
“same decision” might have been made absent the criterion,
Congress rejected the approach taken in Price Waterhouse. 243 Proof
that a prohibited criterion was a “motivating factor” for an
employment decision suffices to establish a violation under the Act.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act thus underscores that the interpretive
emphasis should be on the employer’s actual motivation rather than
the strict question of causation.
Title VII has long served as a guidepost in crafting the legal
response to discrimination in jury selection. In fact, Batson’s
architecture was borrowed almost wholesale from two leading Title
VII intentional discrimination cases, McDonnell Douglas v. Green244
and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine.245
Jurisprudentially speaking, it makes sense to look to Title VII as a
guide, because the fundamental dynamics in both cases are
remarkably similar. 246 As the Batson court framed it, the central
issue in a peremptory challenge case is whether a juror was excluded
“on account of race.”247 Title VII, which is part of a broader fabric of
243

Price Waterhouse held that an employer that succeeded in proving that it would have
made the “same decision” was not liable at all, which was overturned by the 1991
Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
244
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
245
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
246
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-98 nn.18-21 (noting relevance of Title VII “disparate
treatment” cases to “operation of prima facie burden of proof rules,” parameters of
neutral explanation, and ultimate inquiry regarding intentional discrimination).
247
476 U.S. at 89.
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employment discrimination law intended to eradicate discrimination
from private employment decisionmaking,248 makes it unlawful for
an employer, inter alia, “to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”249
The essential regulatory problem is thus very similar in Title
VII and Batson. An employer traditionally has been assumed to
possess the right, within the normal parameters of contract law, to
hire and fire employees at his or her discretion; that is, for any
reason, or for no reason at all. Title VII interferes with the
employer’s traditionally broad discretion, but it does not purport to
supplant it.250 As a result, Title VII permits employers to make
employment decisions based on any criteria except those specifically
enumerated by statute.251
Peremptory challenges, which have a historical pedigree as
long as the “at-will” presumption in master-servant law,252 also
assume unchecked discretion. Like the traditional authority of
employers to hire and fire without having to provide “cause,”
248

See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) (noting
that Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 “is but part of a wider statutory
scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide” that includes Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V),
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)).
249
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2, 78 Stat. 255 (emphasis added). This statutory language
parallels Section Four of the 1875 Civil Rights Act provision dealing with jury selection,
which provides that “no citizen possessing all other qualifications, which are or may be
prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of
the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 405 (Field, J., dissenting).
250
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 297 (noting that Title VII was not intended to
“diminish traditional management prerogatives”).
251
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (noting that “Title VII
eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving
employers’ freedom of choice”).
252
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 212-214 (explaining that peremptory challenges
have “very old credentials,” were employed in England “[i]n all trials for felonies at
common law,” and received specific mention by Congress in the 1790 Act, 1 Stat. 119
(1790)).

MIXED MOTIVES

62

peremptory challenges need not be based on objective criteria, need
not be explained or defended, and are not subject to “judicial
scrutiny.”253 Just as Title VII did not impose a “for cause”
requirement on employment relations, the Batson court did not seek
to supplant the peremptory challenge regime with a “for cause”
system of strikes.254 Instead, Batson, like Title VII, attempted to
preserve a general regime of unrestricted discretion limited only by a
small set of prohibited causes or reasons for the exercise of a
peremptory strike.255 Although Batson’s critics have long observed
that regulation of peremptory strikes exercised for improper reasons
is logically problematic, given that peremptories have traditionally
permitted the exclusion of jurors for any reason, or no reason at all,256
the Batson opinion itself took pains to assure that the proponent of a
challenged strike need not give reasons for the strike that amount to
“cause” for the strike.
Given the similarities, the ultimate solution to the mixedmotive problem adopted by Congress casts valuable light on the
mixed-motive issue in Batson, and suggests that a comparable
standard is warranted, whereby a Batson violation will be deemed
complete in a mixed-motive case upon a showing that an improper
bias was a motivating factor in the decision to strike a juror. Not
only is this approach consistent with Title VII, it is also the approach
used more generally in the analogous context of multiple sufficient
causation tort cases.
B. Substantial Factors and Multiple Sufficient Causation
As noted above, tort causation doctrine has long recognized
that where an actor’s tortious conduct was an independent sufficient
cause of an injury, the fact that other independent sufficient causes
253

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 211-212.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Justice Marshall argued that the only way to prevent
discrimination was to limit strikes to cause. See id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer has made similar arguments in several recent cases. See, e.g., Miller-el v.
Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
255
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.4 (noting that Congress expressly deleted the
phrase ‘for cause’ “in favor of the phrase ‘for any reason other than’ one of the
enumerated characteristics” when Title VII was enacted) (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 25672571 (1964)).
256
U. S. ex rel. Darcy v. Handy 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956).
254
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also contributed to or caused the injury should not preclude
recovery.257 As Justice Brennan argued in Price Waterhouse, a
causally overdetermined event is, nonetheless, still the product of the
causes that brought it about.258 Such cases are often said to involve
“multiple sufficient causes.”259
Multiple sufficient cause cases are those in which an injury
can be traced to two separate and distinct sources, each of which
alone would have been sufficient to cause the injury. One example
of a multiple sufficient cause case involves two campers who
negligently light campfires in a dry area.260 The fires converge,
burning out of control, and causing a major forest fire. Each of the
fires alone would have been sufficient to cause the forest to burn.
Because the forest fire would have occurred regardless of the
individual negligence of each camper alone, under conventional
causation principles, neither camper’s campfire was the “but-for”
cause of the forest fire. Nonetheless, courts consistently have held
that under such circumstances, both campers face joint and several
liability for the injury.261 The decision to relax causation standards
reflects a policy-based consideration that causation standards must
give way to the need to make sure that an innocent victim is not
deprived of a remedy where any uncertainty regarding the causal
mechanism of injury is attributable to wrongdoers.
Multiple sufficient cause cases present harder problems,
however, where one of the multiple sufficient causes was non257

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §432; Carpenter, supra note 27. See supra
text accompanying nn. __.
258
490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
259
See David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66
TENN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1999).
260
See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 497-498 (2006).
261
Fischer, supra note 244 at 1129-30. In the classic multiple sufficient causation case,
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), two hunters negligently shot in the
direction of a third hunter, who suffered several gunshot wounds as a result. Finding
both hunters actions negligent, the court relieved the plaintiff of the burden to prove that
either of the negligent hunters were the “but-for” cause of plaintiff’s injury. See also,
Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902) (where two motorcyclists ride
simultaneously past a rider on horse-drawn wagon, frightening the horse and causing
injury to the driver, both motorcyclists liable even though neither’s negligence was the
“but-for” cause of plaintiff’s injury).
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tortious. In that instance, some courts impose liability on the
tortfeasor as long as “the tortfeasor’s conduct was a ‘substantial
factor’ in producing the harm.”262 Other courts have declined to hold
the defendant liable where an innocent source would have
independently caused the loss in any event, on grounds that doing so
puts the plaintiff in a better position than he would have been in
absent the tortious conduct.263 Using the prior example, imagine that
camper A negligently sets a fire that would have burned out of
control, but that fire converges with a second fire started by
lightning, that also would have burned out of control. If A is held
liable for the fire, then the plaintiff is in a better position than he
would have been in, since the lightning would have caused the forest
to burn in any event.
As Martin Katz argues, one party receives a windfall no
matter which causation standard is invoked.264 If no but-for
causation is required, then the plaintiff is made better off than he
otherwise would have been. However, if but-for causation is
required, then the tortfeasor receives a windfall. After all, there is no
dispute that the tortfeasor’s conduct was wrongful, and if not for the
“fortuitous” fire, the tortfeasor would have been liable for the injury.
To the extent that the mixed-motive problem in
discrimination cases can be (and has been) likened to the problem of
multiple sufficient causes,265 it is technically more analogous to the
latter case than the former, in that conduct motivated by mixedmotives is said to be “caused” by both wrongful and innocent
motives. For two reasons, however, the multiple causation analogy
counsels in favor of relaxing but-for causation in the mixed-motive
context.

262

Fischer, supra note __, at 1130; 490 U.S. at 263-264 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that the multiple causation rule has been applied by courts where an innocent
cause combines with a wrongful one to shift burden of proof to defendant to prove that
his conduct was not the legal cause of the harm).
263
See Fischer, supra note __, at 1130.
264
See Katz, supra note 156, at 521 (noting that where two sufficient causes trigger the
harm, “someone—either the plaintiff or the defendant—will always receive a windfall”).
265
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion); id. at 263-264 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
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First, for policy reasons, overlooking a wrongful motive
simply because the proponent of the strike can convince the trier of
fact that the same result would have ensued allocates the “windfall”
to the wrongdoer at the expense of the defendant, the juror, and the
criminal justice system in general. For the reasons explained above,
strong policy arguments counsel against recognizing the validity of
the mixed-motive defense in Batson cases. Second, the purposeful
exclusion of a juror on account of an invidious discriminatory
purpose is not merely negligent, it is an intentional act,266 and as
such, the causation standards applicable to intentional torts are more
relevant than those applicable to negligent ones. For good reason,
where the actor’s conduct is intentional, tort law has long preferred
the more relaxed causation standard applicable in cases of multiple
tortious causes than the stricter causation requirement recognized in
some multiple sufficient cause cases where a wrongful cause
accompanies an innocent one.267 In intentional tort cases, the injury
combined with the intent to cause it establish a sufficient equitable
basis for liability as long as the actor’s conduct might be said to have
contributed to the risk. As the Restatement explains, where the actor
acts with the purpose of causing “the harmful result which ensues,
questions of legal causation are not pertinent except where the
defendant’s act in no way has increased the risk of harm; it is enough
that his act was a cause in fact or … was a substantial factor in
causing the harm.”268
An attorney who strikes a juror for “mixed motives” in a
Batson case acts with the purpose of causing the harmful result that
266

Robert A. Kearney, The High Price Of Price Waterhouse: Dealing With Direct
Evidence Of Discrimination, 5 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 303, 332 (2003) (noting that
“discrimination is an intentional tort”).
267
See W. Page Keeton et al., Prossor and Keeton of the Law of Torts § 8, at 37 (5th ed.
1984). See also Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer's Holiday, 37 GA.
L. REV. 1251, 1306 n.133 (2003) (“Because of the state of mind required to prove that a
defendant is liable for an intentional tort, any intervening event, such as another person's
negligence, typically does not break the chain of causation between the defendant's
intentional act and any resulting harm that is a consequence of that intentional act.”);
Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, The First Amendment v. The First Amendment: The Dilemma
of Inherently Competing Rights in Free Speech-Based “Constitutional Torts,” 71 UMKC
L. REV. 27, 54 (2002) (observing that causation standards in intentional tort cases are
easier to satisfy than in unintentional tort cases).
268
REST. TORTS § 870 (c).
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in fact occurs, that is, excluding the juror from the venire, and in so
doing, triggers Batson’s deterrent purposes.269 The presence of this
wrongful motive, moreover, certainly increases the risk that the juror
will in fact be excluded, even if there are other reasons or motives
that also contributed to the juror’s exclusion.270 It follows, therefore,
that as long as the wrongful motive was a “substantial” or
“motivating” factor, the issue of but-for causation should be moot.
The substantial factor test, “grounded in notions of equity and
fairness,”271 places a priority on rooting out wrongful conduct rather
than limiting damages, and it bars actors that have been proven to
have acted wrongfully from escaping a liability determination
simply because they can show that other causative forces were at
work.272 Such an approach is much more consistent with the
categorical language of equal protection, and more faithful to the
court’s long-established efforts to root out discrimination from jury
selection, than is mixed-motive analysis’s emphasis on windfall
prevention.273
269

Cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Where an
individual disparate treatment plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision,
the deterrent purpose of the statute has clearly been triggered.”)
270
See Katz, supra note 156, at 518-519 (noting that use of improper criterion in
decisionmaking regardless of but-for causation is harmful because “the utilization of
protected characteristics increases the risk of an adverse ultimate employment decision”).
271
Brodin, supra note 202, at 317.
272
See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990) (discussing tort
law multiple causation doctrine).
273
Of course, the multiple sufficient cause analogy has serious analytical shortcomings.
The most significant difference between a mixed-motive case and a multiple sufficient
cause case is that “motives” are not the equivalent of distinct “causes.” Unlike a multiple
causation tort case, there is only one wrongdoer. At issue is not the causal effects of the
actor’s chosen conduct, but the proper characterization of the actor’s mental state in
choosing the conduct. The closest analogy may not be a tort analogy at all, but rather a
criminal law analogy. Numerous crimes require proof that the defendant acted with a
particular purpose or intent for conviction. Take burglary, for example. To prove
burglary under the common law, the state must prove, inter alia, that the defendant
entered a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein. A defendant who breaks
and enters a dwelling for a non-felonious purpose is not guilty of the offense. Now
consider the case of the “mixed-motive” burglar, who breaks into a home 1) to warm
himself, and 2) to steal food. Imagine further that it is a very cold night, and the
defendant can prove at trial that he would have entered the house solely to escape the
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The substantial factor standard helpfully supplements the
“taint” approach adopted by several courts. Although the taint
approach suggests that any indication or suggestion of an improper
purpose might suffice to establish an equal protection violation, a
standard that could be triggered by the mere mention of an improper
criteria risks delegitimizing Batson by establishing a standard courts
would simply refuse to enforce. The motivating/substantial factor
standard has already been utilized in the Court’s Batson case law,274
and is familiar to courts in other contexts. The approach specifically
defines the plaintiff’s proof burden in terms consistent with wellestablished equal protection doctrine. Courts that have adopted the
“taint” approach have acknowledged that peremptory strikes
exercised even in part for wrongful purposes undermine Batson’s
purposes.275 The substantial factor test, as used in Title VII liability
determinations and in various analogous tort contexts, clarifies that
the threshold to trigger a finding of taint is the finding that a
discriminatory purpose was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor is
one that violates the equal protection clause as a matter of law.
Applied to Batson disputes, a substantial factor test would
marginally strengthen the protections against the discriminatory use
of peremptory strikes, and marginally narrow the power of litigants
to strike jurors on the basis of arbitrary criteria. At least one sitting
justice is on record as opposing the institution of peremptory strikes
altogether.276 Rejection of mixed-motive analysis, and reliance on
cold. In other words, his motive of stealing food was not the “but-for” cause of the breakin. Despite the presence of mixed-motives, such a defendant is almost certainly guilty.
The relevant question is not whether there were “non-criminal” motives sufficient to
explain the defendant’s conduct, but whether there was any culpable intent present.
Because discrimination in jury selection is an affirmative wrong, it may be
preferable to treat the intent question as one of culpability rather than one of causation. A
prosecutor who admits to an invidious bias and who proceeds to follow a course of action
consistent with it is culpable, regardless of any other innocent motives also consistent
with that course of action.
274
See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003); Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 360 (1991).
275
As the South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned, “any consideration of discriminatory
factors in this decision is in direct contravention of the purpose of Batson which is to
ensure peremptory strikes are executed in a nondiscriminatory manner.” Payton v.
Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 60 (1998)
276
See Miller-el v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the substantial factor test, would be far less disruptive of the juryselection process than abolition of peremptory strikes. Indeed, its
adoption is unlikely to have any measurable impact on prosecutorial
power. Continued availability of the “for cause” strike removes the
possibility that truly biased jurors will be empaneled. The converse
is not true. Widespread recognition of the availability of the mixedmotive defense might lead to widespread changes in the way
prosecutor’s respond at step two of the Batson inquiry, and could
further weaken the ability of courts to prevent trial attorneys from
using peremptory strikes for discriminatory purposes.
C. The Windfall Problem
Of course, Title VII does reserve a place for the “same
decision” defense, but it limits it to the choice of remedies. Title VII
actions, and constitutional tort cases like Mt. Healthy, routinely
involve potentially large compensatory awards. On the outcome
often hinges momentous effects on the plaintiffs’ careers, such as
tenure for Doyle in Mt. Healthy and partnership for Hopkins in Price
Waterhouse. The windfall problem is heightened where there is an
element of comparative negligence and the award of damages
requires a selection between two at-fault parties. In Mt. Healthy and
Price Waterhouse, for example, adverse employment decisions were
made both because of improper criteria used by the employer and in
part based on the plaintiffs’ alleged performance deficiencies. The
but-for causation rule protects one wrongdoing party from being
obligated to compensate another absent strong proof that the
defendant’s wrongdoing caused the harm.
The Mt. Healthy mixed-motive test fashioned its causation
standard not from tort law, however, but from approaches to
remedies in exclusionary rule cases.
Enforcement of the
exclusionary rule often means abandoning reliable evidence of guilt,
and sometimes abandoning a prosecution against a verifiably guilty
person. Like tort cases and other actions for monetary damages,
therefore, enforcement of the exclusionary rule also “provides some
defendants with a windfall.”277 Because of the strong public policy
277

See Akhil Reed Amar, THE C ONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 28-29 (1997); Karlan, supra note 201, at 2015.
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interest that probative evidence not be excluded from trial unless
absolutely necessary to vindicate the purposes of constitutional law,
the Supreme Court has held in a long series of cases that the
exclusionary rule remedy must be narrowly drawn. For instance,
even if the accused initially demonstrates that evidence admitted
against him was “a fruit of the poisonous tree,” it remains available
to the “Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an
independent origin,”278 that it inevitably would have been
discovered,279 or that some intervening independent cause rendered
the connection between the unlawful conduct and the outcome “‘so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’”280 Each of these defenses
permits the government, in effect, to use the fruits of unlawful
searches or interrogations notwithstanding that the unlawful conduct
was a causal factor – and probably even a “substantial factor” – in its
discovery. The narrowing limitations on the poisonous tree doctrine
were adopted notwithstanding that their availability inevitably
diminishes the marginal deterrent value of the exclusionary rule and
raises concerns regarding the judicial integrity of the tribunals that
permit the evidence to be so used.281
Whereas tort law balances the goals of corrective justice with
those of optimally apportioning the costs of accidents among the
parties,282 the constitutional criminal procedure cases invoked by
Rehnquist in Mt. Healthy reflect a concern with fashioning the least
intrusive remedial scheme consistent with the goal of deterring
unconstitutional conduct.283 Given the virtual absence of any
278

Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-448 (1984).
280
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
281
See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 817 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that independent source exception to poisonous tree doctrine will “provide
government agents with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional violations
of the privacy of the home”).
282
See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26 (1970) (discussing public-regarding purposes of tort law).
283
As Justice Stevens has explained, the Court has not mechanically applied the
exclusionary rule “to every item of evidence that has a causal connection with police
misconduct.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 825 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
“‘The notion of the 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the
detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent
279
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countervailing interest in corrective justice by a defendant seeking to
exclude probative evidence of guilt at trial, the optimal level of
deterrence is quite low. The exclusionary rule jurisprudence’s
emphasis on deterrence places the analytical focus on the wrongdoer
rather than the victim, and the remedies are designed with an
emphasis not on restoring the victim to the position he would have
been in “but-for” the wrongdoing, but in depriving the state of the
fruits of its wrongful conduct in order to put the state back in the
position it would have occupied absent the violation.
The enforcement of Batson, however, does not pose any
comparable risk of overcompensation. Although equal protection in
jury selection was first recognized as an element of the right to a fair
trial, 284 limitations on the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes
are not solely, or even principally, designed to remedy a cognizable
injury to the litigant. A defendant may have an interest in assuring
that members of his or her own racial, ethnic, or gender group are
not excluded based on those criteria, but there is no requirement that
a defendant prove that the exclusion of a juror on account of an
improper criteria actually affected the outcome of the case or
otherwise harmed the defendant.285
Unlike in exclusionary rule cases or actions for monetary
damages, therefore, enforcement of the Batson right at trial does not
result in any obvious tangible gain for the defendant.286 One of the
premises of Batson is that exclusions predicated on race, ethnicity,
effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.’” Id. (quoting Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975)(Powell, J., concurring in part).
284
The defendant’s interest in assuring that members of his racial group are not
discriminatorily excluded, however, was the initial harm that equal protection doctrine
acknowledged. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881) (stating that a citizen is
entitled to a right ‘“that in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property,
there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimiantion against them, because of
their their color’”) (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879)).
285
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s
decision to permit Batson challenges where defendant and struck juror are not members
of same group because majority “does not even pretend that the peremptory challenges
here have caused this defendant tangible injury and concrete harm”).
286
Compare Batson motions with Fourth or Fifth Amendment suppression motions. In
the latter cases, the defendant who prevails at the suppression hearing obtains a quite
substantial benefit: the exclusion of probative evidence. The suppression remedy is so
potent, in fact, that it often results in practice in the dismissal of charges altogether.
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or gender are illogical and, therefore, that reliance on such criteria
does not even advance the rational interests of the striking party.
Even if that premise is relaxed, the benefit that accrues to a party
prevailing in a Batson dispute is highly ethereal. In denying a party
the ability to exercise a peremptory strike, the court does not force
the party to accept a juror as to whom there is an objective basis to
suspect bias – any such juror could be struck for cause.
The costs of strictly enforcing Batson at trial are de minimis –
at most, a juror who one of the parties has an unsubstantiated hunch
or belief will view the case less favorably than others will sit on the
jury.287 Even assuming that these hunches are accurate more often
than not (an assumption not necessarily supported by empirical
evidence), the litigants’ marginal decrease in control over the jury
panel is compensated by the marginal increase in the number of
minority jurors that will sit on juries, enhancing the public
perception of integrity, fairness, and impartiality of the jury system.
The proper enforcement of Batson claims by the trial court thus
simply does not threaten to reward defendants with any “windfall.”
The remedy of appellate reversal for a Batson violation can
look like a “windfall” in some instances – particularly where there is
no reason to believe that the violation made any difference to the
outcome, or where retrial is not practically possible – but the
apparent windfall only results from the trial court’s error.288 The
question whether the remedy of reversal is appropriate to correct
trial court error, however, is fundamentally different from the
question of whether zealous enforcement of the right in question
itself risks unfairly rewarding litigants or criminal defendants.289 The
287

The two remedies for a Batson violation detected during jury selection are 1)
overruling the strike and empaneling the juror, and 2) calling a new venire. Although the
latter remedy is obviously more onerous than the former, it is still far less onerous than
retrial. See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1436 (2001) (describing trial court remedies and noting that
“once a decision favorable to the challenger is made the corrective action is easy”).
288
See Peter Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 713, 791 (1999) (arguing that lack of harmless error review of Batson violations
creates perception of windfall when defendant successfully challenges a conviction on
appeal).
289
This distinction may not seem so significant to appellate courts who must decide
whether to penalize an apparent violation with the reversal remedy, and because they
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harmless error doctrine has been developed to address this different
kind of windfall problem, but for reasons discussed below, that
doctrine has not been applied to Batson violations and, for the same
reasons, mixed-motive analysis should not be permitted to serve as a
substitute.
D. Harmless Error
It is well-established that Batson errors are exempt from
harmless error review. The harmless error doctrine is predicated on
the assumption that it is normally possible to isolate the effects of a
procedural error and assess whether the error likely had an impact on
the outcome. Such types of “trial errors” include the admission of
improper evidence,290 errors in instructing the jury,291 and improper
comments to the jury.292 However, errors the effects of which are
impossible to trace (such as the total deprivation of the right to
counsel293) or which trench upon interests unrelated to the reliability
of the proceedings (such as violation of the right to a public trial294)
are considered “structural errors” that are not subject to harmless
error review. Like the failure to provide counsel to a defendant,
Batson errors are “structural errors,” the effects of which are
impossible to isolate or trace.295 Given the practical impossibility of
proving that exclusion of any one juror would have changed the
outcome at trial, adoption of a harmless error doctrine in Batson
cases would effectively remove appellate courts from enforcement
of Batson. As a result, an appellate court finding of a Batson

cannot “calibrate the remedy,” as a result, appellate courts are undoubtedly tempted to
“fudge on the right instead.” Karlan, supra note 201, at 2015.
290
See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (admission of evidence in
violation of Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause deemed harmless in capital sentencing
proceeding).
291
See, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (erroneous jury instruction
containing conclusive presumption deemed harmless error).
292
See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on
defendant’s invocation of right to silence deemed harmless error).
293
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (describing deprivation of right
to counsel as a structural error not subject to harmless error review).
294
See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)
295
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
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violation results in a per se reversal.296 Although automatic reversal
is a serious threat, and might be perceived as a windfall for the
defendant, it serves an important function. The threat of reversal
creates powerful incentives for trial judges to ensure that jury
selection is not infected by racial discrimination.
No doubt, the impetus toward the adoption of mixed-motive
analysis can be explained in part by the problems created by the
combination of per se reversal and retroactive application of
Batson’s more demanding standard to trials conducted before it was
decided. Many of the lower federal court decisions, including
Howard v. Senkowski, that adopted mixed-motive analysis involved
pre-Batson trials. Undoubtedly, courts are naturally hesitant to
overturn convictions where there is no evidence of obvious
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor nor any obvious reason to
doubt the reliability of the conviction. In convictions obtained prior
to Batson, where prosecutors did not know that race or gender-based
peremptory strikes were strictly unlawful, it is understandable that
reviewing courts might be tempted to downplay the seriousness of
the constitutional violation.297 Some appellate court decisions that
have affirmed the use of mixed motive analysis in Batson cases
reflect what appears to be a presumption that the admitted
discrimination was de minimis. Such a conclusion is easy to justify
in a mixed motive case, since the prosecutor’s purposes are
obscured. The turn to mixed motive analysis in these cases has
functioned as a mechanism to avoid what otherwise would be
mandatory reversal – i.e. as a de facto harmless error doctrine. But
harmless error review is not appropriate in this context.
A mixed-motive finding is the equivalent of a finding that the
discrimination did not matter to the outcome; it was irrelevant. For
296

See, e.g., Tankleff v. Senkowski,135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Leonard
L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure ot Meet the
Challenge of Discriminaitoin in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 544 (noting
critically that “the typical appellate court that finds a Batson violation will simply reverse
the conviction outright, without a consideration of whether or not the Batson error was
harmless” and suggesting that harmless error review should be adopted).
297
The same dynamic was apparent in the wake of Miranda. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Tucker, (upholding conviction notwithstanding failure of interrogating officers to
administer one of the Miranda warnings, where three other warnings were given and
there was no reason for officer to know that fourth warning was required).
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reasons similar to those that preclude harmless error review in
Batson cases in general, that argument should not be permitted in the
mixed-motive context either. As a practical evidentiary matter, it is
virtually impossible to reliably determine the effect of the
discriminatory bias on the decisions made by an attorney during jury
selection. Evidence that bias influenced that process should be
sufficient to establish a violation, and permitting a party that has
relied in part on discriminatory criteria to escape sanction by
convincing a court that they would have made the “same decision”
anyway effectively “shields wrongdoers from liability.”298 Such a
rule is easier to implement and preserves the role of appellate courts
in policing jury selection to effectuate the goals of equal protection.
In addition, the reluctance to penalize prosecutors for failure to
comply with standards not yet articulated is no longer valid. After
twenty years of living with Batson, every trial lawyer is on notice
that she may not exercise peremptory strikes on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or gender. There is far less justification for a quasiharmless-error doctrine now than there was a decade earlier.
The use of mixed-motive analysis in Arlington Heights points
to a second, and more subtle, kind of harmless error review. Where
judicial review of legislative or administrative rulemaking is
concerned, courts have a practical concern with the preservation of
judicial capital and resources. Courts abhor decisions on questions
that are “moot” or not yet ripe, and generally seek on grounds of
futility to avoid issuing edicts that can be easily circumvented.
Challenges to legislative or administrative enactments based on
purported unlawful motive raise precisely those kinds of concerns.
After all, if a legislature can simply repass the same statute, but
simply articulate a different justification for it, the initial finding of
unconstitutionality will seem rather pointless.299 The mixed-motive
298

See Katz, supra note 156, at 517 (noting frequency of criticism of but-for causation
test as shielding wrongdoers from liability).
299
See Palmer v. Thompson 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (explaining that “there is an
element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of
its supporters” because “[I]f the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of
its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or
relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons”); Brest, supra note 38, at 126
(discussing argument against judicial review of legislative motives based on fear that
review will be futile, because “a particular decisionmaker whose law is once struck down
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test articulated in Arlington Heights saves the courts, and the
legislature or administrative body, that trouble by providing that if
there is a permissible reason for the statute that would have resulted
in its passage anyway, the court should keep its powder dry.
The futility justification, however, does not apply to Batson
disputes. Although prosecutors possess the discretion initially to
remove virtually anyone from the jury with a peremptory strike, the
legitimacy of the strike stands or falls on the legitimacy of the
reasons articulated in their defense. Unlike in the legislative context,
where nothing stops the legislature from reenacting the same bill,
prosecutors who lose Batson motions may not strike the same juror
again after they think up a better reason.300 Discretionary abuses in
using peremptory strikes result in the permanent inability to make
the “same decision” later. Accordingly, there is far less justification
for permitting a “same-decision” defense where it already has been
established the initial decision was substantially influenced by
discrimination.
Batson cases thus raise no windfall problems if they are
properly resolved at trial, and harmless error review for mistakes
made by the trial court is no more warranted in mixed-motive cases
than in a simple, single motive case. For these reasons, and given
the symbolic, deterrent, and evidentiary goals underlying Batson, the
proper approach to mixed-motive cases in Batson is the approach
Congress adopted under Title VII. Defendants bringing Batson
challenges should not be required to prove anything more than “that
race or another forbidden criterion was a motivating factor in the

because it was illicitly motivated will readopt the law, retaining his illicit motivation but
taking care to conceal it”).
300
Not only does the prosecutor lack a second chance to strike a juror when a Batson
objection is upheld, she also can not “save” a strike that was exercised for what later is
acknowledged to be an improper reason by showing that there were other adequate
reasons for the strike. On appeal, the question for the reviewing court is not whether the
prosecutor might have had good reasons for striking a juror, but solely whether the
prosecutor's real reasons were permissible. See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418; Miller-El,
125 S.Ct. at 2332 (“A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up
any rational basis.”).
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decision.”301 Batson’s non-remedial purposes are better served by a
rule that precludes the use of peremptory strikes that are even in part
The substantial or
motivated by discriminatory animus.302
motivating factor test, which reflects basic equal protection
principles, better serves the goals of assuring that the defendant is
tried by a fairly selected jury, that no juror will be excluded from
jury service on account of his or race, ethnicity, or gender, and that
the criminal justice system itself remains unblemished by
discriminatory animus.
CONCLUSION
The expansion and consolidation of the Batson doctrine
represents a widespread legal and social recognition that
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender is
fundamentally unacceptable, and marks a triumph of equal
protection principles. But the story is not one of unmitigated
success. Increased recognition that overtly discriminatory jury
selection practices are unacceptable has brought increased
sophistication in masking or hiding the selection criteria actually
employed. This increased sophistication requires more rigorous
enforcement of Batson. Mixed-motive analysis, however, portends
just the opposite. Mixed-motive analysis fundamentally dilutes
Batson’s protections by permitting prosecutors to exclude jurors
notwithstanding an express admission of an invidious intent.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the propriety of
mixed motive analysis, but it cannot dodge the issue forever – the
storm is gathering. Widespread acceptance of mixed motive will
almost certainly lead to the evisceration of Batson’s already minimal
protections. Shortly after Price Waterhouse was decided, Congress
amended Title VII to provide that a plaintiff who establishes that a
301

Brodin, supra note 202, at 317 (arguing that deterrent goals of Title VII counsel
against requiring plaintiffs, for liability purposes, in Title VII cases to prove more than
that illicit criteria was a motivating factor in decision).
302
Cf. Malone, supra note 247, at 91 (arguing in favor of substantial factor test: “If the
fire started by plaintiff was sizeable and merges with another fire, why must the court
require the jury to make an estimate at plaintiff’s risk as to whether defendant’s fire
would have worked the same destruction unaided? If the flames he caused to be put into
motion were actively playing a part, is it not enough to inquire whether that part was
sufficient to warrant an imposition of liability”).
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discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in an adverse
employment decision has prevailed for purposes of establishing her
employer’s liability. The amended Act clarified that the mixedmotive defense, while available, is only relevant to limiting available
remedies. Congress has thus unequivocally declared that any
adverse employment action that was motivated, even in part, by a
discriminatory purpose contravenes the basic antidiscrimination
purposes underlying the law.
That recognition is equally valid in the jury selection context.
As under Title VII, demonstration of even one discriminatory motive
should suffice to establish a Batson violation. After all, “[t]he mere
existence of discriminatory practices in jury selection ‘cast[s] doubt
on the integrity of the whole judicial process.’”303 This conclusion is
especially warranted because Batson’s safeguards are so easily
overcome by prosecutors intent on discriminating in jury selection,
and because the evidence available to determine whether a strike
was exercised for an improper purpose is so elusive.304 Because
there is no opportunity to take discovery, no ability to examine the
prosecutor directly, and no other way to substantiate a discrimination
claim except through reliance on the explanation provided by the
prosecutor, Batson will be ineffective unless its step-two neutrality
requirement is rigorously enforced. In those rare cases where there is
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, failure to recognize an equal
protection violation under Batson would undermine the “Court’s
unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination” from jury
selection.305 Mixed motive analysis applied in the context of
discriminatory peremptory strikes is unnecessary, unworkable, and
in conflict with the basic purposes for which Batson was crafted.
The Supreme Court should say so.

303

United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972))
304
See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 322.
305
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.

